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ARTICLE II.
Whether the will is moved by God not only morally, but also physically?

XXIII. Just as the operation of grace is most secret and known only to its giver, so too the manner in which God moves our will is most obscure and transcends the sharpness of the human mind; as Augustine sufficiently indicates in book 8 of The Literal Interpretation of Genesis, chapter 21, saying that "just as the created spirit moves the body, so the Creator Spirit moves the created spirit"; and later adding that if we wish to understand how God moves the spirit, we must first understand how the spirit moves the body, which if we cannot understand, we nevertheless do not deny. Therefore, we are especially in need of the light of the Angelic Teacher to resolve this most difficult and obscure question, if ever we needed it. To receive this light and transmit it to the reader:

XXIV. First, it should be noted from Question 22 on Truth, article 9, that since the act of the will is, as it were, a medium between the power and the object, the change in the act of the will can be considered either from the part of the will itself or from the part of the object. Hence, there can be a twofold motion of the will: one moral and objective, relating to the intellect, placing nothing real and physical in the will, but only extrinsically, through the manifestation of the goodness in the object, alluring and inviting it, which Augustine explains by the example of a sheep which is drawn by the showing of a green branch, and a child who is incited to run by the showing of an apple or a nut: "You show a green branch to a sheep," he says, "and you draw it; nuts are shown to a child, and he is drawn." Hence Virgil in Eclogue 2, line 65: "Each one is drawn by his own pleasure." And he proves this from examples of animals, saying: "The fierce lioness follows the wolf, the wolf itself follows the goat." The other motion relates to the will itself, and changes it intrinsically, and applies it to willing that object which allures it by its goodness and suitability: hence this belongs to the genus of efficient cause, and is called real and physical, or effective and applicative; the former, however, belongs to the genus of final cause, and is usually called Metaphorical or Objective; for the end, since it does not act by its own action, but metaphorically, by alluring the will to love itself, is said to move improperly and metaphorically. One certainly and infallibly induces the effect to which it moves; the other, by its own power and nature, is not efficacious and infallible; because in this state no created object, however much goodness it possesses, indeed not even God Himself, as He is known to us obscurely through faith, can by its own power efficaciously and infallibly determine the will to love itself, as will be clear below. Finally, physical motion, since it is applicative of the will, causes and precedes its

consent and determination: but moral motion seeks and expects the same from the will and, so to speak, begs it from the will, and obtains it as if by entreaty.

XXV. Secondly, it should be noted from the same St. Thomas here in Question 9, article 6, in Part 1, Question 105, article 5, and in other places to be referred to below, that to operate in the will by way of an object is common to all, both to God and to creatures; for both kinds of goodness, whether divine or created, can move and allure the will to love and pursue itself: but God has this special privilege over creatures, that no creature, however perfect, can penetrate into the bosom of the will, and, so to speak, enter the workshop of freedom, nor consequently physically and efficiently change and apply it to willing; because the will, by reason of its dominion and freedom, is superior to and independent of all creatures in its volition and determination. And for this reason we showed in the treatise on Angels that they cannot naturally know the thoughts of hearts, because they are enclosed within the shrine of our heart and breast, which no creature, even an Angel, can enter against the will. Therefore all creatures can only stand at the door and vestibule of the will, that is, at the entrance of the intellect, to solicit it from there, but they cannot enter it unless it opens the bolt of its door. Indeed, even God Himself, proposed by way of an object, must also enter the will in this way. However, as the first efficient cause, and as the author and first principle of the will itself, He can penetrate into it, and work within it, and enter the workshop of freedom, according to Ezekiel 44: "This gate shall be shut, it shall not be opened, and no man shall pass through it: because the Lord the God of Israel hath entered in by it." The question is therefore whether God moves and determines the will, not only in the first way, namely by moral and metaphorical motion, relating to the object, but also in the second way; so that He not only shows it the goodness of the object, and invites and solicits it to love it, but also physically changes and applies it to willing that object which allures it by its goodness and suitability.

XXVI. Thirdly, it should be noted that it is the same thing for God to pre-move the will as to move it: because, as Aristotle says in Metaphysics 4, text 23, "The mover is prior in nature to that which is moved": or as the Holy Doctor says in Against the Gentiles 3, chapter 149, "The motion of the mover precedes the movement of the mobile in reason and cause," that is, by priority of reason and causality. Hence if we prove that God physically moves the will to act, by that very fact we will show that He physically pre-moves it.

§ I.
The Mind of St. Thomas is Revealed.

Although the authority of St. Thomas is very great among the wise and learned, nevertheless in this question it is of such weight that Clement VIII and Paul V judged that the examination of this opinion should be referred to the mind and doctrine of St. Thomas, as to a Lydian stone. Therefore, before we weigh the Theological reasons in favor of our opinion, it is worthwhile to reveal the mind of this Holy Doctor, and to demonstrate in many ways that he clearly favors our opinion in several places.

I say therefore, according to St. Thomas, that God not only morally, but also physically pre-moves the created will to operate.

XXVII. This is proved first by a general argument: St. Thomas in various places, such as Part 1, Question 105, article 5, and Part 1-2, Question 109, article 4, and Against the Gentiles 3, chapter 70, and Question 3 on Power, article 7, teaches that God moves and applies all causes (under which the created will is undoubtedly included) to their operations; which cannot be explained of moral motion (since natural causes, as they lack reason, are not capable of it) but only of physical motion: but by such motion and application, neither the conferring of active power, nor simultaneous concurrence can be understood: therefore in these places St. Thomas admitted previous concurrence, or physical pre-motion. The major premise is clear from the cited places. The minor premise is also evident as to its first part; since St. Thomas there expressly distinguishes motion and application from the conferring of operative power, saying in the cited place on Power: "God is the cause of every action, insofar as He gives the power to act, and insofar as He preserves it, and insofar as He applies it to action." Likewise there he adds: "In a third way, one thing is said to be the cause of another's action, insofar as it moves it to act, in which is understood neither the conferring nor the preservation of active power, but the application of power to action: just as a man is the cause of a knife's cutting, from the very fact that he applies the sharpness of the knife to cutting, by moving it": therefore St. Thomas, by the name of motion, which he attributes to God with respect to all secondary causes, does not understand the conferring or preservation of the active power granted to them. Hence below in Question 109, article 1, he says thus: "The action of the intellect and of any created being depends on God in two ways: in one way, insofar as it has from Him the perfection or form by which it acts: in another way, insofar as it is moved by Him to act."

XXVIII. That it cannot be explained by simultaneous concurrence (as Suarez interprets it in book 3 on Aids, chapter 38, Peter of St. Joseph in the work which he calls A Defense of St. Thomas, dispute 2, section 3, and several other more recent authors) can be demonstrated in multiple ways. First, because, as we showed in the third note, the motion of the mover, according to St. Thomas, is prior to the movement of the mobile in nature and causality: but simultaneous concurrence is not prior in causality and nature to the operation of the secondary cause, otherwise it would not be simultaneous, but previous: therefore it cannot be called the motion of the secondary cause. Hence excellently P. Nicolai in Part 1-2, Question 109, in his commentaries on article 1: "How willingly blind must those be who do not see that St. Thomas recognized physical pre-motion! For what is it to move to action, if not entirely to pre-move? How does one move something to act, unless he makes it act from not acting? Moreover, does he make it act from not acting, unless he first acts on it, or precedes its motion? Is not to precede its motion so that it may act, or to make it move to action, to physically pre-move? That is, efficiently and really."

XXIX. Secondly, St. Thomas in the cited place on Power in reply to the 3rd objection says: "In the operation by which God operates by moving nature, nature does not operate": but when God concurs simultaneously with natural causes for their operations and effects, nature does operate, as is evident: therefore by such concurrence God does not move it, but only by previous concurrence, in relation to which nature behaves in a merely passive way.

XXX. Thirdly, the same Holy Doctor there in reply to the 7th objection says: "That which is done by God in a natural thing by which it actually acts, is like an intention alone, having a certain incomplete being, in the way that colors are in the air (namely in intentional being, by reason of the species which represent them) and the power of art in the instrument of the artist": but these cannot be verified of simultaneous concurrence; for it is not a certain flowing and transient power, nor does it have a diminished, incomplete, intentional being, similar to that which the species of colors existing in the air have, as is manifest; since such concurrence is the very action of the secondary cause, as it depends on God simultaneously influencing and operating: therefore the same as before.

XXXI. Fourthly, St. Thomas in Part 1, Question 105, article 2, in reply to the 1st objection says: "God, by moving creatures, touches them according to virtual contact": but by simultaneous concurrence God does not touch secondary causes by virtual contact; since by such concurrence He impresses nothing real on them, but only acts with them, as the adversaries teach: therefore by the motion by which God moves creatures, St. Thomas

did not understand simultaneous concurrence, but previous concurrence, by which He acts on secondary causes, and impresses on them some flowing and transient power. Hence there in Question 103, article 8, he says that "Every inclination of something, either natural or voluntary, is nothing else than a certain impression from the first mover: just as the inclination of an arrow to a determined target is nothing else than a certain impression from the archer." And in Question 22 on Truth, article 8: "Just as every natural action is from God, so every action of the will, insofar as it is an action, is not only from the will as the immediate agent, but from God as the first agent, who impresses more vehemently."

XXXII. Fifthly, When two causes simultaneously influence the same effect, by such concurrence one is not said to move and apply the other to acting, but only to help it: e.g., when two people pull the same cart, one is not said to move the other, but both are said to move the cart: therefore similarly when God simultaneously with a secondary cause produces the same action and effect, He is not said to move the secondary cause, but to help it.

XXXIII. Sixthly, According to St. Thomas in Opuscule 3, chapter 130, "God must be present to any agent interiorly, as it were acting in it, while He moves it to act": but by simultaneous concurrence God does not act on secondary causes, but only operates with them, especially when the action of the secondary cause is transient; for this, according to the common opinion, is not received in the agent, but in the patient: therefore by simultaneous concurrence God does not move secondary causes to act.

XXXIV. You will say first with Suarez, that God does not move secondary causes to act by simultaneous concurrence actually exhibited, and considered in the second act, because such concurrence is nothing else than the very operation of the secondary cause, as it is from God simultaneously influencing; nevertheless He moves and applies them by simultaneous concurrence considered in the first act, or by the decree by which He determined to concur simultaneously with secondary causes for operating.

XXXV. But against this: To move a secondary cause is to change it intrinsically, since motion is essentially change: but by the decree of concurring with secondary causes, God does not change them intrinsically; since He produces nothing in them, but only determines to concur with them, as the adversaries teach: therefore by such a decree He does not move them.

I add that, according to St. Thomas cited above, that by which God moves causes to act, "Is like an intention alone, having a certain incomplete being, etc." But these cannot be

verified of the decree of concurring with secondary causes, as is evident: therefore this solution most openly contradicts the mind of St. Thomas.

XXXVI. You will say secondly with the same author, and other more recent authors: If St. Thomas, by the name of motion and application, which he attributes to God with respect to secondary causes, had not understood simultaneous concurrence, he would have been ignorant of it, or omitted it, since he makes no mention of it anywhere: but this cannot be said without grave injury to the Holy Doctor: therefore by such motion and application he understood simultaneous concurrence.

XXXVII. But this also is frivolous, and can easily be refuted. First, because it is false that St. Thomas nowhere made express mention of simultaneous concurrence: for in the cited place on Power in reply to the 3rd objection, he says thus: "In the operation by which God operates by moving nature, nature does not operate, but the operation of nature itself is also the operation of divine power." In these words he expressly distinguishes in God a twofold concurrence; one which is from God alone, nature itself not operating, which therefore is previous, and precedes the operation of the secondary cause at least by priority of nature; another which is identified with the aforesaid operation, and this is simultaneous concurrence, which is the very operation of the secondary cause, as it depends on God simultaneously influencing. Hence he adds there in reply to the 4th objection that "Both God and nature operate immediately, although they are ordered according to prior and posterior." Likewise in Part 1, Question 105, article 5, after he had taught in the body of the article that God moves things to operate, by applying their forms and powers (by which words, as we showed above, he signified previous concurrence) afterwards in reply to the 2nd objection he clearly expressed simultaneous concurrence, saying: "One action does not proceed from two agents of one order, but nothing prohibits one and the same action from proceeding from the first and second agent": therefore St. Thomas expressly mentioned simultaneous concurrence.

XXXVIII. Then: Even if in the cited places he did not express it clearly and distinctly, because there he was explaining the ways in which God is the cause of the action of the secondary cause, insofar as it emanates and proceeds from it; nevertheless, it is not permissible to infer from this that he was ignorant of it, or omitted it: for it can be said that by the name of Motion and Application, he comprehended every actual concurrence of God with secondary causes, whether previous or simultaneous; because since those two concurrences exist in the same instant, and have an indissoluble connection between them, and one relates to the other, namely the previous to the simultaneous, they behave as one, according to that common axiom taken from the Philosopher in Topics 3, chapter

2: "Where there is one thing on account of another, there is only one thing": hence they can be expressed by a single name, and comprehended under the word Motion or Application.

§ II.

A notable testimony of the same Angelic Doctor is presented.

XXXIX. Besides the clear and evident testimonies which we presented in the preceding section, there is another in Opuscule 1 (which the Holy Doctor published at the command of Urban IV against the errors of the Greeks) so evident and explicit that it seems St. Thomas foresaw the future opinion of the Thomists and the Moderns, approving the former and rejecting the latter. For explaining in chapter 23 how a creature cooperates with the creator, he speaks thus: "It should be known that something is said to cooperate with another in two ways: in one way, because it operates toward the same effect, but through another power; as a servant to his master, while he obeys his commands, and an instrument to the craftsman by whom it is moved" (behold the explicit opinion of the Thomists, with the example of predetermination, both moral and physical: for it is evident that the master first morally moves and determines the servant through his commands, but the craftsman first in nature physically moves and determines the instrument, applying it to the work, and thus physically moves and predetermines it). "In another way, someone is said to cooperate with another, insofar as he performs the same operation with him: as if it were said of two people carrying the same weight, or of several pulling a ship, that one cooperates with the other." (Behold the explicit opinion of Molina, Suarez, and other more recent authors, with the very examples which they use, namely of two carrying the same weight, or of several pulling a ship.) "According to the first way, therefore" (adds the Holy Doctor) "a creature can be said to cooperate with the creator; but in the second way a creature does not cooperate with the creator, but only the three Persons (of the Most Holy Trinity) cooperate with each other, because their operation is one: not, however, in such a way that each of them possesses a part of the power by which the operation is completed, as happens in many pulling a ship (for thus the power of each would be imperfect) but in such a way that the whole power sufficient for the operation is in each of the three Persons." Nothing clearer than this for the Thomists against the more recent authors can be produced. Indeed, St. Thomas suggests that these latter attribute to creatures what is proper only to the Persons of the Most Holy Trinity. St. Bonaventure expressly teaches the same doctrine in 2 Sentences, distinction 34, question 1, in reply to the 5th objection, with these words: "It is not to be understood that God cooperates with free choice, as when two carry a stone, one cooperates with the other: but because God is intimately acting in every action, and is intimate to the power

itself that is operating; such that the power itself does not go forth into anything that is not from Him."

XL. From this it is clear how much faith should be given to the Fuliensian, when he says that he has turned over all of St. Thomas's works with the greatest diligence and attention, and has nowhere found physical predetermination: for he begins his book with the opuscules of St. Thomas, and yet does not have even a word about the authority just adduced. Certainly either his negligence in reading St. Thomas was extreme, while he omitted that which first occurred to his eyes; or what is more likely, he concealed this authority, because he saw it was completely insoluble. And what is remarkable, he began his book with testimonies taken from the ninth opuscule, of which it is doubted whether it is St. Thomas's, and accordingly it was published by order of Pius V in very small characters; and he suppressed or concealed the testimony taken from the first opuscule, which is undoubtedly accepted by all as the legitimate offspring of the Holy Doctor.

§ III.

The mind of the same Holy Doctor is further declared by other testimonies.

The testimonies expounded in the preceding paragraphs are general, and prove that God physically pre-moves all secondary causes, whether natural or free, to action, according to the principles of St. Thomas's doctrine. However, others also must be weighed, by which it is especially shown that the same Holy Doctor admits both kinds of motion, both physical and moral, in God with respect to the created will, as the conclusion stated in the first paragraph holds.

XLI. It is proved, therefore, first: Motion which is on the part of the object represented by the intellect is moral and objective, but that which is on the part of the power, and truly and really changes it, is called physical and effective: but St. Thomas in various places teaches that God moves the will, not only on the part of the object, alluring and inviting it intrinsically, but also on the part of the power, changing it really: therefore he admits not only the moral, but also the physical motion of God. The major premise is clear from what was said before in the first note. But the minor premise is proved from St. Thomas in Part 1, Question 105, article 4, where he asks, "Whether God can move the created will?" And in the body of the article he distinguishes two kinds of motion, of which one is on the part of the object, and the other on the part of the power, and concludes: "That in both ways it is proper to God to move the will (understand efficaciously, as he explains there), but especially in the second way, by inclining it interiorly." And in Question 106, article 2, in the body, he says: "On the part of the power itself, the will can in no way be

moved, except by God. For the operation of the will is a certain inclination of the one willing toward what is willed: but only He can change this inclination who bestowed on the creature the power of willing; just as only that agent can change a natural inclination, which can give the power which natural inclination follows."

He teaches the same in Question 22 on Truth, article 9, with these words: "Since the act of the will is, as it were, a medium between the power and the object; the change in the act of the will can be considered either on the part of the will itself, or on the part of the object. On the part of the will, indeed, nothing can change the act of the will, except what operates within the will; and this is the will itself, and that which is the cause of the being of the will, which according to faith is God alone: hence God alone can transfer the inclination of the will from one thing to another, according as He wills." Therefore according to St. Thomas, God moves the will not only morally, and on the part of the object, alluring it to love itself by its goodness and suitability, but also physically and on the part of the power, by really changing it, and transferring it from one inclination to another.

XLII. This is confirmed: St. Thomas there in article 8 says thus: "Just as the will can change its act to something else, so and much more can God": but the will changes itself from one act to another not only morally, but also physically, without violence and injury to its freedom: therefore a fortiori God can do this.

XLIII. This is further confirmed: St. Thomas in the cited place of Part 1, where he teaches that God moves the will, "by inclining it interiorly," immediately opposes to himself arguments which proceed from violence and injury to freedom, as can be seen there: but he would oppose these arguments to himself ridiculously, if he taught only moral and objective motion; since there can be no doubt or suspicion for anyone that that motion inflicts violence, or injures freedom: therefore he truly admits physical motion.

XLIV. Secondly, the mind of the same Holy Doctor can be investigated from what he teaches both here in Question 9, article 6, and in Part 1, Question 111, article 2, and in Against the Gentiles 3, chapter 88, and in several other places, where he asserts that it is so proper to God to move the will, that this can belong to no created agent: but created agents can move the will morally, and by way of persuasion, as he expressly teaches in the same places, especially in the cited place from Part 1 where he says: "God alone can efficaciously move the will, but an Angel and a man by way of persuasion": therefore according to the principles of St. Thomas, God moves the will in a higher way, and therefore physically.

XLV. This is confirmed: St. Thomas in the cited places, giving the reason why God alone can move the will, assigns no other than that God alone, since He is the author and cause of the will, can penetrate within it, and change it intrinsically, as is clear from the cited place in Against the Gentiles 3, where he reasons thus: "It is necessary that every motion of the will proceed from an interior principle: but no created substance is conjoined to the intellectual soul with respect to its interior aspects, except God alone, who alone is the cause of it, and sustains it in being: therefore the voluntary motion can be caused by God alone." Likewise in Question 22 on Truth, article 9, he says thus: "On the part of the will, nothing can change the act of the will, except what operates within the will, and this is the will itself, and that which is the cause of the being of the will, which according to faith is God alone," as we related above. He explains the same reason more fully in the Compendium of Theology, which is the third among his opuscules, chapter 129, with these words: "Since the act of the will is a certain inclination proceeding from the interior to the exterior, and is compared to natural inclinations: just as natural inclinations are in natural things only from the cause of their nature; so the act of the will is from God alone, who alone is the cause of the rational nature having a will. Hence it is clear that it is not against the freedom of choice, if God moves the will of man; just as it is not against nature that God operates in natural things: but both the natural and the voluntary inclination is from God, who precedes both according to the condition of the thing whose it is; for thus God moves things according to what befits their nature. It is clear therefore that the heavenly bodies can impress on the human body and its bodily powers, just as on other bodies; but on the will God alone can impress." But this discourse would not be valid, but would be entirely nugatory, if St. Thomas were speaking of moral motion only: because for purely moral and objective motion, relating to the intellect, and the object represented by it, penetration within the bounds of the will is not required, nor its real and physical change; and for that kind of motion it is irrelevant that God is the author and cause of the will, since Angels, who are not its causes, can move it morally, and by way of persuasion, as we showed above: therefore St. Thomas is to be understood concerning physical motion.

XLVI. The above conclusion is proved thirdly: Moral and objective motion takes place through the internal illumination of the mind, by which the goodness and suitability of the object is shown to the will: but according to St. Thomas, God moves the will otherwise than through the internal illumination of the mind: therefore He moves it physically, and not only morally. The minor premise is proved from St. Thomas, lecture 5 on chapter 8 of the Epistle to the Romans, where, weighing these words of the Apostle: "Whoever are led by the Spirit of God, these are the sons of God," he adds: "It could be understood thus: whoever are led by the Spirit of God, as by a certain guide and director;

which indeed the Holy Spirit does in us, insofar as He illuminates us interiorly as to what we should do: but more is to be understood; for those are said to be led, who are moved by a certain superior instinct: hence we say of brutes that they do not act, but are acted upon, because they are moved by nature, and not by their own motion, to do their actions. Similarly, indeed, the spiritual man, not as if principally from the motion of his own will, but from the instinct of the Holy Spirit, is inclined to do something, according to Isaiah 59: 'When he shall come as a violent flood, which the Spirit of God drives.' And in Luke 4 it is said that Christ was led by the Spirit into the desert. Nevertheless it is not excluded by this, that spiritual men operate through will and free choice: because the Holy Spirit causes in them the motion itself of the will and of free choice, according to Philippians 2: 'It is God who works in us both to will and to accomplish.'"

XLVII. It is proved fourthly: Motion which is of itself and intrinsically efficacious, and with which the dissent of the will can never be compounded, is physical, and not only moral: but according to St. Thomas, God moves the will with motion that is intrinsically efficacious, and such that it is repugnant that the dissent of the will be compounded with it: therefore He moves it physically, and not only morally. The major premise is certain, and will be clear from what will be said below in paragraph 10. The minor premise is proved from St. Thomas in Question 6 on Evil, article 1, in reply to the 2nd objection, where he says: "God moves the will immutably, on account of the efficacy of the moving will, which cannot fail." And here in Question 10, article 4, in reply to the 3rd objection: "If God moves the will to something, it is impossible to posit that the will is not moved to that." Likewise in Part 2-2, Question 24, article 11, he asserts that "The power of the Holy Spirit infallibly operates whatever He wills: hence it is impossible for these two things to be simultaneously true, that the Holy Spirit wills to move someone to an act of charity, and that he loses charity by sinning."

XLVIII. Finally, the same conclusion is persuaded: To move the will morally is to move it by way of an end, whose motion is only moral and metaphorical: but to move it physically is to move it by way of an agent, which operates through true and proper efficiency: hence St. Thomas in Part 1, Question 82, article 4, says thus: "Something is said to move in two ways: in one way by way of an end, as the end is said to move the efficient cause; and in this way the intellect moves the will, because the good understood is the object of the will, and moves it as an end. In another way, something is said to move by way of an agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and what impels moves what is impelled. And in this way the will moves the intellect, etc." But from the same Holy Doctor in Against the Gentiles 3, chapter 88, reason 5: "God alone can move the

will by way of an agent": therefore God alone can move it physically; but other extrinsic agents, such as men and Angels, can only excite and move it morally.

§ IV.
According to St. Thomas, God not only pre-moves, but also predetermines secondary causes.

XLIX. There are some who think that St. Thomas indeed frequently teaches the pre-motion of the will, but nowhere its determination or predetermination by God, and His decree, or concurrence; because they think it belongs to the nature of freedom that the will so determines itself by its own counsel and choice, that it is determined by no extrinsic agent, even uncreated. But this is a scruple of a fastidious stomach, thus distinguishing between motion and determination: for if St. Thomas posits pre-motion or motion in the will, so that its indifference and suspension may be resolved, what else is pre-motion than predetermination? And if according to St. Thomas, "To be moved from itself, does not repudiate that which is moved by another," why will "to be determined from itself," repudiate that which is determined by another? But that this scruple may be entirely removed, I produce several places, in which the Holy Doctor uses the name of Determination, indeed even of Predetermination.

L. The first is taken from Part 1, Question 23, article 1, in reply to the 1st objection, where he explains in what sense Damascene says that those things which are in us are not predetermined by God, namely because He does not impose necessity: for although predetermination there is taken for eternal predefinition, nevertheless it is extended to temporal motion, which is the execution or causality of the predetermining decree. From which I form the argument thus: Although St. Thomas denies that those things which are in us are predetermined, insofar as predetermination implies the imposition of necessity; nevertheless he does not absolutely deny that they are predetermined, but rather, excluding only the imposition of necessity, he supposes this, nor does he otherwise admit the authority of Damascene, who denies that the same things are predetermined: therefore according to St. Thomas, God predetermines our free acts, without the imposition of necessity, or without injury to freedom. Hence in Against the Gentiles 3, chapter 90, at the end, explaining the same place of Damascene, he says thus: "What Damascene teaches, that those things which are in us, God foreknows, but does not predetermine, is to be explained so that it is understood; that those things which are in us, are not subject to the DIVINE DETERMINATION, as if receiving necessity from it": by which words he openly declares, that those things which are in us are subject to divine determination, and consequently predetermined by God, although from such predetermination there does not

follow the imposition of necessity, or the destruction or injury of freedom, as our adversaries object to us. Hence here in Question 10, article 4, he says: "Thus God moves the will, that He does not of necessity determine it to one thing": therefore he admits motion determining to one thing, not by way of nature, and by imposing necessity or destroying the power to the opposite, but by way of freedom, and fostering and preserving freedom, or leaving the power to the opposite. Hence P. Nicolai in Part 1-2, Question 111, in his commentaries on article 3, thus inveighs against the adversaries of physical predetermination: "St. Thomas (they say) did not recognize it, and because of this he was most Angelic; nor should it be recognized by Catholics, because it destroys freedom. How great a blindness, that they have not seen in so many places so evident at least as to the thing itself, since he said a hundred times that we are so moved or determined by God to act, that the motion of God precedes and causes our actions? What is this, moreover, if not physical and real predetermination or pre-motion? As to what should not be admitted, because it destroys freedom, it is a fantasy of the drowsy; and that not to admit it is Angelic, is a thought scarcely human. It certainly destroys freedom, if it is such as is feigned by them in a dream, an active indifference opposed; if it so attaches to this part, that it takes away the power to either; if it so impels, that it cannot be repelled or rejected by the will. But why do they play with the word to mock, unless they too are mocked? Predetermination is not said in the true sense otherwise, than by taking away passive indifference or indetermination, while it applies the non-acting to acting; who, while indetermination remains, would not act: but whenever St. Thomas inculcates that the will is so determined by God that it is not to one thing fixedly, not with necessity, not immutably, but is determined according to the condition of the will, and can nevertheless resist that determining one, can reject his determination, etc."

LI. Then the same Holy Doctor in Quodlibet 12, article 4, subscribes to the opinion of those who say, "That all things are PREDETERMINED by the providence of God." And he adds it can be granted, that all things are subject to fate, if by the name of fate we understand divine providence, predetermining and preordaining all things which are done in the world, although we should not use this name of fate, because it is not fitting to have names in common with the Gentiles. And finally he concludes with Augustine: "If anyone understands fate in this way, let him hold the opinion, but correct his tongue, that he may not say fate, but the providence of God."

LII. This is confirmed: The immovable disposition of God, inhering in the will, is true predetermination: but to deny it, is (according to St. Thomas in Against the Gentiles 3, chapter 93) to deny providence; for he says there, that he who denies fate, according to that acceptation, according to which it is taken for the immovable impression on the part

of God in movable things, denies divine providence: therefore from St. Thomas, he who denies predetermination inhering in the will, denies divine providence.

LIII. Finally, the same Holy Doctor in the same book, chapter 2, reason 7, and in other places to be referred to below, expressly teaches that from a contingent and indifferent cause to either alternative, a determined act or effect cannot proceed, unless it is first determined by another: hence since the will is a contingent cause, and is indifferently related to many things, according to the principles of St. Thomas it is manifest, that it must be predetermined by God, so that it may proceed to a determinate act. About which fully in paragraph 8.

LIV. From these things it is clear, that this name of Predetermination is not new, nor devised by the Thomists (as their adversaries everywhere object to them) but frequently used by St. Thomas, at least to signify the eternal predefinition of the divine will: hence since physical pre-motion, according to the Thomists, is its execution and instrument, and as it were a little stream flowing from that fountain, it can not undeservedly be designated by the same name as that. Especially indeed since the name of Application, which St. Thomas frequently uses, is equivalent to the name of Predetermination: for what is it for the will to be predetermined, if not to be applied to a determinate act?

LV. I add that Scripture, the Church, and the Holy Fathers sometimes use names, which seem to signify more than pre-motion and predetermination: as is evident when it is said in Luke 14: "Compel them to enter": and when the Church in the secret collect of the 4th Sunday after Trinity prays to God, "That He may graciously compel our rebellious wills." Likewise in Romans 2 it is said: "Those who are led by the Spirit of God, these are the sons of God." And Augustine often asserts that the human will is "Invincibly and Inevitably" led by divine grace: that God inclines the hearts of men "by most omnipotent power" whither He wills: and that human wills cannot resist Him. Indeed, if we attend to the force of the names, it seems to be something greater, that the will is compelled by God, that man is led invincibly and inevitably, and is inclined by most omnipotent power, than that it is physically predetermined.

Finally, let our adversaries show, please, in St. Thomas, or in any of the Theologians and Doctors, who wrote before Molina, the names of Middle Knowledge, indifferent decree, congruous grace, and other similar ones, which they frequently use; and we will likewise show them the name of Physical predetermination in the same authors. Certainly if it was permitted to them, to devise new names to declare a new thing, why will it not also be permitted to us, to use the ancient name of predetermination to defend the ancient doctrine, which is used not only by St. Thomas, but also by St. Dionysius chapter 5 on

the divine names, indeed even by the Apostle himself, to declare the causality and efficacy of divine decrees: for wherever in the Epistles of St. Paul we have the name of predestination, in the Greek there is προορισμός; which word means the same as Predefinition and Predetermination?

§ V.
Several Fathers of the Society admit that physical predetermination is in accordance with the mind of St. Thomas.

LVI. Since Novatian in chapter 18 on the Trinity rightly said, "It is a firm kind of proof, which is taken from adversaries, so that truth may be proved even by the enemies of truth themselves," I cannot more effectively demonstrate that physical predetermination is in accordance with the mind of St. Thomas, than by showing that adversaries do not deny this, and by producing several of their testimonies. For as Eucherius says, "Without doubt, he relies on various privileges who asserts his cause from his adversary's instruments. It is a splendid victory to ensnare the opposing party with its own documents as with its own snares."

LVII. That St. Thomas taught physical predetermination in various places is admitted first by the Coimbra College, which should be counted as many: for in Physics 2, chapter 7, question 14, article 1, it writes: "Concerning the way in which God concurs with secondary causes for their operations and effects, there presents itself the celebrated opinion of St. Thomas in Part 1, question 105, and in Part 1-2, question 109, article 1, and in question 7 on Power, article 7, question 2, of Ferrariensis in Against the Gentiles 3, and his followers, Capreolus in 2 Sentences, distinction 1, chapter 70, and others, who believe that all secondary causes, before they operate, receive from God a certain influx and motion, which is, as it were, the intentional being of the divine power, by which they are stirred to produce actions, in the way that the instruments of a craftsman, such as a plane and an ax, receive prior motion from the craftsman, when they are applied to make a work."

LVIII. Bellarmine also in book 4 on free choice openly professes this to be the opinion of the Angelic Doctor. For in chapter 14, having proposed to himself Calvin's objection, which is drawn from the repugnance of the cooperation of the divine will with human freedom, and having rejected three responses—namely those of Cajetan, Durandus, and Almain—he chooses two as more probable, and more suitable for explaining the harmony of divine cooperation with free choice. In the first place, in chapter 15, he explains the harmony of divine cooperation with free choice, through purely

simultaneous concurrence, which is indifferent, and able to be determined by the created will to the species of the act. Hence there he denies that God moves and applies the will to work, as is clear from the first argument which he objects to himself in this way: "Between the first cause and the second there is a certain essential order, so that the first moves the second, and the second does not act, unless moved by the first: but God is the first cause; our will, however, is the second: therefore God moves the will and applies it to work." To which argument he responds thus: "I respond that there is that order between the principal cause and the instrumental cause, that one moves the other; but between the first cause and the second, since the second is not properly an instrument, there is not an order such that one moves the other, but such that one is prior to the other in perfection, unlimitedness, and necessity, etc." By which words he openly teaches that God through simultaneous concurrence does not move and apply the will to work. Then he attempts to solve other arguments which militate for physical predetermination, as will be clear to the reader. Finally in chapter 16 following, he explains another account of the harmony of freedom with God's cooperation through previous concurrence moving and applying secondary causes, even free ones, to operate: "Another way," he says, "of reconciling human freedom with divine cooperation, AND PERHAPS EVEN MORE PROBABLE, is ACCORDING TO THE OPINION OF ST. THOMAS, who teaches that divine cooperation so concurs with secondary causes, even free ones, that it not only has given them and preserves their operative powers, but also moves them and applies them to work, as can be known from Part 1, question 105, article 5, and book 3 Against the Gentiles, chapter 70, and question 3 on Power, article 7. This opinion seems very much in agreement both with Scripture, which says that we are, live, and move in God; and also with reason and the order which the first cause has with secondary causes." By which words that most learned Cardinal not only asserts that our opinion is more probable, and very much in agreement with sacred Scripture, but also attributes it to St. Thomas, proving his mind from the places which we adduced above, but especially from question 7 on Power, article 7, in which place Suarez admits that St. Thomas admitted physical pre-motion, as will be clear below. Nothing, therefore, is more true than that Bellarmine admitted previous concurrence determining and applying the will to work. Nor can it be said, as a certain more recent author inconsiderately says, that Bellarmine understood simultaneous concurrence by that motion and application. Both because in the preceding chapter he expressly denies, as was seen above, that God moves and applies the will to work through simultaneous concurrence. And also because if he had understood simultaneous concurrence by such motion and application, this second way of reconciling human freedom with divine cooperation, which he says is more probable, and taken from St. Thomas, would not differ from the preceding one, in which he had taught with

Ariminensis, Scotus, and Gabriel, that God's concurrence does not determine our will, nor is it previous, but only simultaneous, and consequently Bellarmine would be talking nonsense, and doing what was already done, and committing an inept tautology; which cannot be said without great injury to so great a man.

I add that the Doctors of the University of Louvain, in an epistle prefixed to their censure against Lessius, testify that Bellarmine publicly taught at Louvain the opinion contrary to that of Molina and Lessius, and taught physical predetermination. Hence if what Fuligatus and Silvester Petrasancta assert in the life of this Cardinal is true, namely that, already near to death, in the presence of a public notary, he professed that he had given to the truth what he had asserted in the books of Controversies, and had not changed the first opinion at all, it is manifest that he taught in his Controversies—indeed in the place related above—previous concurrence, moving and applying the will to work, with St. Thomas and his disciples.

I do not deny, however, that Bellarmine differs from some Thomists in this, that they think that previous concurrence is a motion or a flowing quality impressed on the will: but he believes that God through Himself immediately, without the impression of any quality, uses the created will, and applies it to work. Which is also taught by Nazarius, Sylvius, Azorius, and other asserters of physical predetermination. Hence Bellarmine admits previous concurrence or physical predetermination as to its substance, although he differs from some more recent Thomists in the way of explaining it, and therefore he is cited for this opinion by Sylvius in his work On the First Mover, part 2, article 26.

LIX. Pererius and Azorius also favor it: for the former in book 8 on causes, chapter 8, says thus: "In what St. Thomas adds, that secondary causes, and among them our will, are moved, APPLIED, and DETERMINED by God to act, although some Theologians dissent; nevertheless I go very willingly with hands and feet into that opinion: for this is the nature, this the condition, this the connection and context of movers and causes subordinated per se and essentially, that the posterior does not move, unless moved by the prior: in the order of movers, says Aristotle in Physics 8, text 41, that which is prior is more the cause of moving than the subsequent, and is moved more. And in the little book on causes, proposition 4, it is said that the first cause concurs more, more vehemently, more intimately, and more inseparably to the effects of secondary causes, than the secondary causes themselves, and that it helps secondary causes in their operations, and is more the cause of the effect than the secondary causes. Just as therefore in other kinds of causes per se subordinated to each other, the posterior cause necessarily presupposes the causality of the prior, as in forms the sensitive being presupposes the vegetative, and

this the corporeal; and in matter the secondary presupposes the primary, and the same happens in ends per se subordinated; so also in movers per se subordinated to each other, the posterior necessarily presupposes the first, and the causality of the first cause is prior in nature than the causality of the secondary cause." But the latter in book 1 of Moral Institutions, chapter 24, question 8, has this: "It is asked in the eighth place, whether God, when He operates with nature or the will, moves and applies it to act? St. Thomas openly says thus: God not only gives forms to things, but also preserves them, and applies them to action, etc. But to me the opinion of St. Thomas seems most true: for Augustine seems plainly to hand it down, etc. For a secondary cause seems to be called such because it is moved by the first: otherwise it would only be a cause with the first; just as when two simultaneously carry a beam, where, because one is not moved and applied to carrying by the other, he cannot be called a secondary cause, compared to the other, but is simultaneously a cause with the other, etc." Likewise in book 4, chapter 22, question 2: "A few, more junior Theologians," he says, "perhaps to make our will free, make it sacrilegious, while they deny that God PREDEFINES OUR GOOD WORKS." Henriques speaks in almost the same way in his book on the end of man, chapter 6, where among other things he says: "It is not so difficult to understand, as some think, that with the use of our free cooperation preserved, God, tempering the force of His concurrence, moves with efficacious aid, both PHYSICALLY ON THE PART OF THE POWER, and morally on the part of the object." And in chapter 24 he shows that the opinion of Molina and Lessius is entirely repugnant to the doctrine of St. Augustine and St. Thomas.

LX. Caramuel also reports in Fundamental Theology, thesis 5, note 4, that in the year of the Lord 1654, in the University of Vienna, Father Herwart of the Society of Jesus, a Doctor of great intelligence, defended again and again, "That a quality is possible, which from its physical and real essence would induce infallibility with freedom uninjured." "It was," he says, "a celebrated disputation, and because I was ordered to argue in the first place, I will subjoin one or another consequence. I said thus: A quality is possible, which from its real and physical essence induces infallibility, and does not take away human freedom: therefore it is possible that middle knowledge is not given in God: therefore in fact middle knowledge is not given: therefore in fact physical predeterminations are given, if not necessitating in the composite sense, at least rendering infallible." And after he has pursued all those consequences, he thus concludes: "The more attentively I consider that thesis, the more clearly it seems to me to subscribe to the opinion of the Thomists."

LXI. Cardinal Toledo is not to be passed over: for he in Physics 2, chapter 3, question 8, expressly teaches that God applies a secondary cause to acting, and moves it, just as an

instrument is moved by a craftsman. Cosmas Alemannius asserts the same in the Summary of the Philosophy of St. Thomas, Part 1-2, question 11, article 4. Molina also in the Concordia, dispute 26, does not deny that this opinion is that of St. Thomas, although afterwards he seems to be doubtful, for he says: "St. Thomas in Part 1, question 105, article 5, teaches that God operates with secondary causes in a twofold way: in the first place, because He gives powers to them for operating, and actually preserves them, as Durandus was saying: then, because He so moves them to act, that He in some way applies their forms and powers to operation, not differently than a craftsman applies an ax to cutting." But Suarez in book 1 on the concurrence of God, chapter 11, numbers 4 and 7, says that St. Thomas held this opinion in question 7 on Power, article 7, but afterwards retracted it in the Summa. About which below in Section 13.

LXII. Finally, that physical predetermination is or seems to be in accordance with the mind of St. Thomas, is openly handed down by the small book concerning the method of studies, composed by six Fathers of the Society, and printed in Rome in the College of the Society, by command of the Father General, in the year 1586. For in it, in the section On the selection of opinions in the Theological faculty, rule 5, it is said thus: "In Theology our men should follow the doctrine of St. Thomas, as is cautioned in Part 4 of the Constitutions, chapter 14, with the exception of a few things, which, although they are or can seem to be those of St. Thomas, nevertheless because contraries, both without danger, and very probably, can be defended, if some wish to teach these, may superiors connive for the greater exercise of minds." And afterwards explaining which are those few things, which they are not held to follow, in number 6, among others it recounts this opinion of St. Thomas: "That secondary causes are properly and univocally instruments of God, and when they operate, He first influences them, or moves them." And soon, after relating other opinions of St. Thomas, which they are not held to follow, in rule 6 it is said thus: "In the rest, which are not excepted here, our men should not recede from St. Thomas." We preserve this book in our convent at Toulouse, and I have in my possession an authentic extract of this chapter or section, On the selection of opinions in the Theological faculty, and signed by the hand of an Apostolic Notary. But that this book has the force of a constitution, although adversaries deny it, is nevertheless clear from the 5th general congregation of the Society of Jesus, canon 9, where it is said thus: "Our Doctors in Scholastic Theology should follow the doctrine of St. Thomas, according to the practice to be placed in the book concerning the method of studies." Having therefore imposed on us such a cloud of witnesses, who candidly profess that physical predetermination was asserted by St. Thomas, it is not permitted to doubt concerning the mind of this Angelic Doctor.

§ VI.
Testimonies of Scripture, and of the Holy Fathers.

LXIII. It is clear from what was said in the preceding section, that God physically predetermines secondary causes, if He applies them to acting: for on account of this, not only the Thomists, but also several of the adversaries, grant that St. Thomas taught physical predetermination, because he taught that God applies secondary causes to acting, as we showed there. If therefore I should expressly find in sacred Scripture that word "Apply," so that God is said absolutely to apply secondary causes, even free ones, to acting, without doubt I shall show that physical predetermination, according to the testimony of Scripture, and of the Holy Spirit, is to be necessarily admitted. But a notable place is found in Ecclesiasticus 33, where it is read thus: "In the multitude of discipline the Lord has separated them, and changed their ways: and of them He has blessed, and exalted, and of them He has sanctified, and applied to Himself, etc." Likewise in Jeremiah 30, God, speaking of the leader who was to be placed over His people, says: "And their leader shall be of themselves, and their prince shall come forth from their midst, and I will apply him, and he shall come near to me: for who is he who would apply his heart to me, or draw near to me, says the Lord?" Where the Lord manifestly promises that He will apply the heart or will of the leader of His people to Himself, or to the love of Himself, and Scripture adds, that by virtue of this application that leader will come to God, and draw near to Him. If therefore to apply a secondary cause to operate, is the same as to predetermine it physically, as we have noted, and as was shown above, the consequence is, that God has promised that He will physically predetermine the will of the leader of the people to the love of Himself; yet in such a way that this predetermination does not impede the cooperation of the will, but rather brings it about and causes it: hence it is placed first that God will apply his will, and afterward it is added, that he will come to God, and will apply his heart to the love of Him, and will draw near to Him, not by steps of the body, but by affections of the mind, as Augustine says.

LXIV. The same application of the human mind and will through grace, and consequently physical predetermination, is openly taught by several of the Holy Fathers. For Augustine in book 1 to Simplician, question 2, says: "Who would dare to say that there was lacking to God a way of calling, by which He would APPLY THE MIND of Esau, and join his will, to that faith in which Jacob was justified?" And there he uses that place of Ecclesiasticus cited above, in which God is said to have applied creatures to Himself. He also uses the same name of applying in Psalm 126, expounding that verse of the Psalmist, "Unless the Lord build the house," for he says: "We speak externally, He builds internally,

He Himself admonishes, He Himself frightens, He Himself opens the intellect, He Himself APPLIES our sense TO FAITH." Likewise St. Bernard in the book on free choice, toward the end, says that God "APPLIES THE WILL TO WORK, and explains the work to the will." And Vega on the Council of Trent, book 6, chapter 6, calls preceding grace, "An unknown APPLICATION of divine power, and a wonderful inclination and BENDING of our will." Cornelius Mussus, Bishop of Bitonto, speaks in the same way in book 1 on divine history, chapters 15 and 27.

§ VII.
A general argument taken from the subordination and dependence of the secondary cause on the first.

LXV. Our Thomists pursue this argument extensively in Philosophy; we will touch on it briefly, so that we may pass to other special arguments for free causes. It can be proposed thus: God is not only the first being, but also the first cause; and therefore just as creatures immediately depend on Him in being, and are subordinated to Him, so also in operating and in causing: but such immediate dependence and subordination cannot be preserved without physical pre-motion: therefore such pre-motion is to be admitted. All Philosophers and Theologians agree on the major, except Durandus, who says that creatures depend on God only mediately and remotely in operating, insofar as they received from Him operative powers. But the minor, which adversaries deny, is persuaded in multiple ways. First from St. Thomas in Part 3, question 19, article 1, where he reasons thus: "Wherever there are several ordered agents, the inferior is moved by the superior, as in man the body is moved by the soul, and the lower powers by reason: therefore the actions and motions of the inferior principle are certain works, rather than operations; but what pertains to the supreme principle is operation." By which words he openly teaches that, to preserve the subordination of the inferior cause to the superior, it is required that the inferior is moved by the superior: hence since from the same Holy Doctor in Against the Gentiles 3, chapter 149, "The motion of the mover precedes the movement of the mobile in causality and nature," to preserve the subordination of the secondary cause to the first, pre-motion is required; which, since it cannot be moral, at least with respect to brutes, and other natural agents, which are not capable of moral motion, must necessarily be physical.

LXVI. Secondly, the same minor is proved: Wherever there is subordination and dependence according to some account, there according to the same account there must be found some order of prior and posterior: but through simultaneous concurrence alone, no order of prior and posterior, in the account of cause actually operating, can be

preserved, between the first and the second: therefore through simultaneous concurrence, the subordination and dependence of the secondary cause on the first in causing cannot be preserved. The major is certain: because subordination essentially implies in its concept some order between those things which are subordinated; for to be subordinated to another, is the same as to be ordered under another; but order essentially implies priority and posteriority, and consequently also subordination. But the minor is proved: That cause is to be judged prior in the account of cause actually operating, which first exercises its causality; for since a cause is formally called such from causality, it is fitting that the order of prior and posterior in causes actually operating, be taken from the order of prior and posterior, which is between the causalities themselves: but through simultaneous concurrence neither cause first exercises its causality: therefore through simultaneous concurrence alone, the order of prior and posterior in causing between the first cause and the second is not preserved, but to establish such subordination, previous concurrence is necessarily required.

Adversaries commonly respond: that the simultaneous concurrence of God is prior to the concurrence and operation of the secondary cause, by priority of dignity, universality, and subsisting by consequence; and that this priority suffices to preserve the subordination and dependence of the secondary cause on the first, in causing.

LXVII. But this response does not weaken, but confirms the force of the proposed argument. For whenever subordination is found between two things in some account, so often priority and posteriority must be found in such an account: but between God and creatures is found subordination, not only in dignity and perfection, but also in operation and causality; since God is not only the first being, but also the first cause, and the first principle: therefore in the concurrence of God there must be priority not only of dignity and universality, but also of nature and causality, and consequently such concurrence must be previous, and not purely simultaneous. Hence St. Thomas in question 3 on Power, article 7, at the end of the body, teaches from the book on causes that "The power of the first cause FIRST ACTS on the effect, and more vehemently enters into it." And in question 27 on Truth, article 6, in the fourth argument, But against, he says thus: "The secondary cause FIRST receives the influence of the first cause, than the acts of the secondary cause." To which argument, because it is entirely consonant with his conclusion, he responds nothing at all, as to others which are sometimes not entirely favorable to him. Likewise in 2 Sentences, distinction 37, question 2, article 2, he says that "It could not be avoided that the human will would be the first agent, if its action were not reduced to some PRIOR AGENT as to a cause."

LXVIII. Thirdly, the principal minor is proved: In order that secondary causes be formally and immediately subordinated to God in causing, they must depend on Him, and be constituted not only in the account of habitual principle, but also in the account of actual principle of their operations: but they cannot be constituted by Him in the account of actual principle, except through previous concurrence, or physical pre-motion: therefore with that removed, the subordination and immediate dependence in causing of secondary causes on the first is removed. The major is clear: because a secondary cause is not actually causing, except by this, that it is the actual principle of its operation. But the minor, which adversaries deny, is easily persuaded. With previous concurrence, or physical pre-motion, removed, only three things are given in the acting cause, namely operative power, operation, and simultaneous concurrence: but none of these three can constitute the secondary cause in the account of actual principle: therefore with pre-motion excluded, nothing on the part of God can be assigned, through which secondary causes are constituted in the account of actual principle of their operations. The major is clear by sufficient enumeration. The minor is proved as to each of the parts. And in the first place, that operation itself cannot constitute secondary causes in the account of actual principle, seems manifest: for that from which operation effectively proceeds, cannot be the operation itself, but must necessarily be something previous to it, and received in the agent: but operation proceeds effectively from the actual principle, as such, and therefore from the constitutive of it. Therefore the constitutive of the actual principle cannot be the operation itself.

That secondary causes cannot be constituted in the account of actual principle either through operative power, or through simultaneous concurrence, is proved by an evident argument. The actual principle of operation has two things, namely that it is indissolubly connected with operation itself (for it is impossible that there be given an actual principle of operation, and the operation itself not be posited) and that it precedes it at least by priority of nature, as being its efficient cause; hence the constitutive also of the actual principle must have the same two conditions, namely priority at least of nature with respect to operation, and indissoluble connection with it: but it is clear that those conditions do not belong to operative power; because since it is potential, it does not have an indissoluble connection with operation, but can be separated from it, at least by the absolute power of God; hence such power does not constitute an actual principle, but only a habitual one, of operation; but simultaneous concurrence, although it is indissolubly connected with operation, and is intimately imbued in it, nevertheless does not precede it by priority of nature, otherwise it would not be simultaneous, but previous; for priority, from which, according to the Thomists, the concurrence of God is called Previous, is not priority of existence or duration, but only of nature and causality:

therefore secondary causes are not constituted by God in the account of actual principle of operation, through operative power, or through previous concurrence, or through the actuality of divine motion; which, since it applies secondary causes to acting, precedes their operation by priority of nature, and has an indissoluble connection with it: hence, as we shall say below, such pre-motion is not the first act, nor the second, but the nexus and bond joining the first act with the second, or power with operation.

LXIX. You will say: For a secondary cause to be actually operating, or the actual principle of its operation, is not something distinct from the habitual principle and operation, but is the habitual principle itself, as it connotes operation.

But this has already been refuted: for prior in nature than operation is understood, the cause is understood to be constituted in the account of actual principle, because from it as such operation issues; for it cannot issue from the habitual principle alone, which, as such, is indifferent and indeterminate.

I add that, since virtue and operative power do not always connote operation, nor always have an indissoluble connection with it, something new must be assigned in the operating cause itself, by reason of which it has that new relation and connotation: for if nothing intrinsic comes to it anew, it will behave in the same way as before; it was only in potency to operation, and only the habitual principle of it, it will remain in the same potentiality and indifference, and not be extracted from the account of habitual principle.

LXX. Fourthly, the principal minor is persuaded. In order that secondary causes be subordinated to God as to the first cause and first principle, they must be applied by Him to acting: but they cannot be applied by Him through simultaneous concurrence, but only through previous concurrence, or through physical pre-motion: therefore with that removed, the secondary cause cannot be sufficiently subordinated to God as to the first cause. The major is proved: The agent which regards the ultimate end of all causes, applies them to their operations: just as because it pertains to a leader to attend to and intend the end of war, it also pertains to him to order, move, and apply soldiers; and just as the will, because it regards the end, applies the other powers to their operations, as St. Thomas teaches here in question 9, article 4; likewise charity, because it has for its object God as He is the supernatural end, orders and commands the acts of the other virtues, and conjoins them with such an end: but the first cause not only regards the end of all secondary causes, but also is their ultimate end, according to that of the Apocalypse: "I am the Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end": therefore He applies all secondary causes to operate: not morally, since only rational creatures are capable of moral motion: therefore physically.

Moreover, as St. Thomas reasons below in question 79, article 2: "Every action is caused by something which is in act, because nothing acts except according as it is in act: but every being in act, is reduced to the first act, namely to God, who is act through His essence: hence it remains that God is the cause of every action, insofar as it is action." From which words I form the argument thus. No created agent is pure act in acting, just as it is not in being, but according to itself is in potency to acting: therefore since nothing acts, except according as it is in act, it is necessary that in order to act, it be applied and reduced to act by the first cause, which is pure act in acting, just as in being.

LXXI. But the minor, which asserts that secondary causes cannot be applied to acting through simultaneous concurrence, was demonstrated in multiple ways above in Section 1 against Suarez, and can be further explained: both because the application of a power is something preceding operation at least by priority of nature, since operation proceeds from the principle as applied; but simultaneous concurrence is not prior in nature to operation, as is clear: and also, because simultaneous concurrence is not distinguished from the very operation of the secondary cause, but is intimately imbued in it: but who would say that something is applied to acting through the very action which it elicits, e.g. a saw for cutting, or a pen for writing, through the very cutting or writing? Who also would assert, that when two horses concur simultaneously to move a cart, or two men to pull a boat, one moves and applies the other to pulling? Suarez is therefore not to be heard, when he says in book 3 on aids, chapter 40, number 17, that for God to make the sun illuminate, or to apply it to illuminating, is not, nor can be, anything else, than to make the sun with the power of illuminating, and concur with it simultaneously for illuminating: for, as we have already shown, when two causes simultaneously influence the same effect, through such concurrence one is not said to move and apply the other to acting, but only to help it, and associate with it to produce such an effect simultaneously with it.

LXXII. You will say: Just as the powers of man are applied by the will, and are subordinated to it in operating, precisely through this, that the will wills them to operate, without their receiving anything from the will: so similarly in order that secondary causes be applied by God, and be subordinated to Him in acting, the immanent act of God suffices, by which He first wills and commands secondary causes to operate, than they operate; nor is it necessary, that through influence ad extra God communicates something to them prior in nature than they operate; and consequently that He physically pre-moves and predetermines them to acting.

LXXIII. But against, first: Although some think that the will applies other powers to their proper operations, impressing nothing real on them, nevertheless the opposite is more probable, and more in agreement with the mind of St. Thomas, as we showed in the preceding disputation, article 1, conclusion 3.

Secondly, with this given and not granted, parity is denied: for a manifest difference is found, consisting in this, that the will and the inferior powers are conjoined in the same supposit, and are rooted in the same soul, but not God and secondary causes: hence although it might be granted, that the inferior powers are applied by the will to their operations, through the volition alone of such motion and application, which is called active Use; it does not follow, however, that secondary causes are applied by God through decree alone or the act of command, without the physical change of them, and the impression of some power or motion, as is openly gathered from St. Thomas in the places brought forth in Section 1, in which he asserts that God by moving creatures, touches them by virtual contact; that every natural and voluntary inclination is a certain impression from the first mover, just as the inclination of an arrow to a determined place, is a certain impression from the archer; that that by which God moves secondary causes, is like an intention having incomplete being, in the way that colors are in the air, and the power of art in the instrument of the craftsman; and similar things which we expounded extensively there, and which for the sake of brevity we do not repeat here.

I add, it is impossible that two extremes begin to refer to each other, unless change is made in one of them: but by this, that a secondary cause is applied by God to operating, it begins to express a real relation of dependence on God, and God a relation of reason to it: therefore it is necessary that one extreme be then changed by the reception of some entity; hence since such change cannot be held on the part of God, it must be held on the part of the secondary cause.

LXXIV. Finally, the principal minor is proved. Since a cause is formally called such from causality, in order that a secondary cause, in the account of cause formally, be subordinated to God, it must be subordinated to Him, and immediately depend on Him, in its causality, as causality is: but with physical pre-motion excluded, the secondary cause does not immediately depend on God in its causality, as causality is: therefore neither is it subordinated to Him in the account of cause. The major is clear, the minor is proved. The causality of the efficient cause is action, as it formally issues forth, and emanates from the agent, as Philosophers teach in Physics 2: but action under that formality of emanation and egress from the agent, is not caused by God, unless the secondary cause is pre-moved by Him to acting: therefore with pre-motion excluded, the secondary cause does not

immediately depend on God in its causality as causality is. The minor is proved: A cause cannot be said to cause the action of another, as it is from it, for no other reason than insofar as it impels and applies it to acting; hence because one horse does not apply another to pulling a cart, but only concurs simultaneously with it, it can indeed be called the cause of pulling absolutely, not however of pulling, as it is from another horse: therefore if God concurs only simultaneously with secondary causes, and does not apply and pre-move them to acting, He will indeed be the cause of their action materially and considered in the being of entity, not, however, formally under the account of action, and insofar as it issues forth and emanates from the secondary causes themselves. Hence Cajetan excellently says, that if God did not move the sun to illuminating, He would not be the cause of the sun's illuminating, although He could be called the cause of illuminating which was from the sun.

Gibufus adds in his book on the freedom of God, and of creatures, chapter 19, that if there is no other influx of God, except simultaneous, God will indeed give being to effects, but will not give effects to causes: because He will not make secondary causes do, and that they, so to speak, give birth, and send forth their operations and effects outside themselves, but only will receive and foster questions and those proceeding from their bowels.

LXXV. You will say with the more recent authors: Although one action can be from a double cause, nevertheless as it is from one, it cannot be from another: therefore although God simultaneously with the creature effects action, and its effect; nevertheless the action of the secondary cause, under that aspect by which it is from the secondary cause, cannot be from God.

LXXVI. But besides the fact that this response does not solve the proposed argument, since it is founded on this, that the secondary cause must immediately depend on God in its causality, as causality is, which is nothing other than the action itself, as it formally issues forth from the agent, and proceeds from its bowels; it can still easily be refuted. For since the concurrence of God is most perfect and most universal, and through itself primarily attains the account of created and participated being, which is intimately imbued in all differences, modes, and formalities of created things; His causality extends not only to the substance and entity of created things, but also to all accounts and modes, expressing perfection, and goodness orderable to God as to the ultimate end: but that dependence of action on the agent cause, or that egress, efflux, and emanation of action from the secondary cause, or as others speak, that exercise of operative power, is not a pure being of reason, but something true and real existing in the nature of things, as is

clear; for (as we were saying above) in such dependence and egress of action from the agent, or in such exercise of power, consists the causality of the efficient cause, which is something real and positive exercised in the nature of things: therefore God through His concurrence must cause the action of the secondary cause, under that aspect by which it depends on it and is caused, and consequently pre-move and apply it to acting.

LXXVII. This is confirmed: in vital actions, the vitality of immanent actions is some real perfection, and therefore must be actually and immediately from God. From which the argument is formed thus: vital action, as such, is actually and immediately from God as from the first cause: but the same action, as vital, is from the secondary cause: therefore what is from the secondary cause, is from God as from the first cause, even according to that aspect according to which it is from the secondary cause. The major is clear, the minor is proved: Because the vitality of created action consists in dependence on an intrinsic created principle, and necessary connection with it.

LXXVIII. From which you have, that although when causes concurring to the same action are of the same order, one cannot cause the action of the other, as it is from it, nevertheless it can when one is of a superior order, and contains all the perfection of the inferior; especially if its causality is most universal, and extends to all accounts and modes of being, as happens in the case at hand.

§ VIII.

A special argument for free causes, taken from the indifference of the will.

LXXIX. St. Thomas touches on this argument here in Question 9, article 4, where he reasons thus: Everything which is sometimes in act, sometimes in potency, needs to be moved, determined, and constituted in act by some mover, which is always in act and never in potency; but the human will is sometimes in act, sometimes in potency; for it begins sometimes to will something, which before it did not will: therefore in order that it may will, it needs to be moved by some mover, which is always in act and never in potency; which, as is clear, can be nothing but God.

He proposes the same argument under other terms in Physics 2, lecture 8, where he says: "Just as motive power, which is to either alternative, does not go forth into act, except through appetitive power it is determined to one, so nothing which is to either alternative goes forth into act, unless through something it is determined to one: because that which is to either alternative, is like a being in potency: but potency is not a principle of acting, but only act: hence from that which is to either alternative, nothing follows, unless through something else which determines to one." And in Against the Gentiles 3, chapter

2: "What is indifferently related to many things, does not operate one more than another; hence from what is contingent to either alternative no effect follows, except through something by which it is determined to one."

LXXX. From which we can form a second argument. From an indifferent and indeterminate principle a determinate action does not follow, unless it is first determined by another which is in act: both because indifferent and determinate are opposed to each other, and are related like cold and hot; and therefore just as from cold, as such, heat cannot proceed; so neither from the indifferent, as it is indifferent, can a determinate act issue forth: and also because that which is to either alternative, is like a being in potency; but that which is in potency, is not a principle of acting, but only that which is in act, as St. Thomas teaches in the cited place, and in Part 1-2, Question 79, article 2, where he says: "Every action is caused by something which is in act, because nothing acts except according as it is in act": but (I subsume) the created will of itself is an indeterminate and indifferent principle to either alternative: therefore it will never go forth into a determinate act, unless it is first determined by that which is always in act with respect to the whole object, that is, by God.

LXXXI. Suarez responds in book 3 on aids, chapters 42 and 45, that our will, although it is indifferent and in potency to its acts, nevertheless on account of the eminence of its power, and on account of its freedom and perfect dominion which it has over its acts, is virtually in act, and therefore does not need to be determined and reduced to act by some extrinsic agent, but can determine itself, and reduce itself to act.

LXXXII. But against: Although the will on account of its freedom has dominion over its acts, nevertheless that is not supreme and absolute, but dependent on the supreme and most universal dominion of God, and subordinated to it: therefore although it can in its own order, and as the second free, and the second mover and determining, move, determine, and reduce itself to act, nevertheless it cannot do this, except with subordination to the first free, and the first mover and determining; and consequently unless dependently on His motion and determination. Just as because a vassal or feudatory does not have supreme dominion over an estate, he cannot dispose of it, except with subordination and dependence on the King, or the Lord to whom he is subject. Hence St. Thomas excellently says in this part, Question 109, article 2, in reply to the 1st objection: "Man is the master of his acts of willing and not willing, on account of the deliberation of reason, which can be bent to one part, or to another: but that he deliberates or does not deliberate, even though he is the master of this also, it is necessary that this be through a preceding deliberation: and since this does not proceed to infinity, it is

necessary that finally we arrive at this, that the free choice of man is moved by some exterior principle, which is above the human mind, namely by God."

LXXXIII. This is confirmed: The same Holy Doctor in Part 1, Question 19, article 3, in reply to the 5th objection, says: "A cause which is of itself contingent, must be determined by something exterior to the effect: but the divine will, which of itself has necessity, determines itself to that willed, to which it has a non-necessary relation." By which words he establishes this difference between the divine and created will, that the divine will, because it is the first free, and the first determining simply, determines itself through itself primarily, and independently of any extrinsic determining; but the created will, because it is not the first free simply, nor the first cause of its choices, does not determine itself except secondarily, and dependently on the motion and determination of the divine will: hence in 2 Sentences, distinction 25, question 1, article 2, in reply to the 3rd objection, he says thus: "The determination of action and of the end is constituted in the power of free choice, although not as in the first agent." Therefore the created will, on account of the eminence of its power, and dominion over its free acts, does not have that it can independently of the motion and determination of God, move and determine itself: indeed rather, since its freedom is potential, and subordinated to God, it needs to be moved, determined, and reduced to act by Him.

LXXXIV. Peter of St. Joseph responds secondly in the work cited above, disputation 2, section 6, that God moves and determines the will, by a certain general motion and determination, insofar as He applies it to the first intention of the end, and to the volition of good in general, from which afterwards through counsel and deliberation it moves and determines itself to the choice of means, or the volition of particular goods.

LXXXV. But against, first: The will by that volition of good in general at most is constituted in first act on its part, to tend through choice to particular goods: therefore besides this general motion, there is still required another special one, by which it may be determined to choose means. The consequence is proved: Because as St. Thomas teaches in the places cited above in Section 1, the secondary cause constituted in first act, still needs the motion and application of God, that it may go forth into second act.

LXXXVI. Against, secondly: From an indifferent principle, as it is indifferent, a determinate act cannot issue forth, unless it is first determined by another, says the same Holy Doctor in the places related above: but with the first intention of the end posited, and the volition of good in general, the will still remains indifferent to the choice of this or that means, or to the volition of this or that particular good: therefore it still needs to be determined by God.

LXXXVII. Against, thirdly: The same Angelic Doctor teaches that the created will is so moved and applied by God, that nevertheless it moves and applies itself: hence below in Question 111, article 2, he divides grace into operating and cooperating, and says that "In that effect in which our mind is moved and not moving, but God alone moving, the operation is attributed to God, and according to this it is called operating grace. But in that effect in which our mind both moves and is moved, the operation is attributed not only to God, but also to the soul, and according to this it is called cooperating grace." About which in the treatise on grace. But in the first volition of the end, and other indeliberate acts, the will does not move and apply itself, but is only moved and applied by God, as the same Holy Doctor teaches here in Question 9, article 4, and is clear from what was said in the preceding disputation, article 2: therefore from St. Thomas, God not only moves, applies and determines the will to the first volition of the end, and to other indeliberate and necessary acts, but also to the choice of means, and to its deliberate or free acts. Hence in Question 6 on Evil, the sole article, at the beginning of the article he says: "Man is moved to choosing by a certain interior instinct, namely from God Himself, and immovably, nevertheless it is not repugnant to freedom," as he explains afterwards in reply to the 5th objection. Likewise in reply to the 17th objection: "The will," he says, "when it begins to choose anew, is changed from its prior disposition, insofar as it was before choosing in potency, and afterward becomes choosing in act. And this change is indeed from some mover insofar as the will itself moves itself to act, and insofar as it is also moved by some exterior agent, namely God: nevertheless it is not moved from necessity, as has been said." Finally in Against the Gentiles 3, chapter 91, he reasons thus: "It is necessary that everything multiform, and changeable, and capable of failing, be reduced as to a principle to something uniform and immutable, and not capable of failing. But all things which are in us, are found to be multiple, variable and defectible; for it is clear that our choices have multiplicity, since they are different and by different ones in different things: they are also changeable, both on account of the lightness of the soul, which is not fixed in the ultimate end; and also on account of the change of things which surround us externally: but that they are defectible, the sins of men testify: but the divine will is uniform, immutable, and indefectible... Therefore it is necessary that the motions of all wills and choices be reduced to the divine will; but not to any other cause: because God alone is the cause of our wills and choices."

LXXXVIII. Thirdly, other more recent authors respond, that the will is determined by the object, as to the species of the act, but by God, as to the individual. So Suarez in Metaphysics, disputation 5, final section, citing Fonseca, Toledo, the Coimbricans, and others.

But against: Although the intellect, through the object proposed, can extrinsically and objectively determine the will to the species of the act, nevertheless this determination does not suffice, that it may be able to go forth into a determinate act: both because since the will is intrinsically indeterminate and in potency, in order that such indetermination and potentiality be taken away, it must be actively determined, and actuated through something intrinsic, namely through divine motion received in it, at least prior in nature than it operates: and also, because in order that it may actually operate, it must be determined not only as to specification, but also as to the exercise of the act; but no created object, indeed not even universal good, which is God, however congruously proposed, can efficaciously move and determine the will of man while he is on the way, as to the exercise of the act, as St. Thomas teaches here in Question 10, article 2: therefore extrinsic determination, on the part of the object, does not suffice.

Then, if God determines the will to elicit this operation in number rather than another, as Suarez teaches, it follows that God takes away freedom, and is the cause of sin, which are two absurd inconveniences, which adversaries everywhere object to us. The consequence is proved as to both parts. And first that the destruction of freedom follows, is shown thus. The freedom of the will is twofold, one of specification, the other of exercise: the first expresses the power of choosing an act of this or that species; the second is concerned with the act in the individual, and as it is exercised here and now: just as therefore adversaries contend, that God would take away the freedom of specification, if He determined the will to the species of the act, because they say, it is so of the nature of the free cause to determine itself, that it is repugnant that it be determined by any extrinsic agent, even uncreated: so from the same principle, which is, as it were, the Achilles of adversaries, it is permitted to us to infer, that the freedom of exercise is destroyed, if God determines the will to elicit this operation in number. Hence either the sword which adversaries sharpen against us is leaden, or by it equally the freedom of exercise is killed.

That also according to this way of speaking, God is the author of sin, is easily persuaded: for in the act of sin as to the individual is found some special malice, and distinct from that which belongs to it according to its specific account, such as that which is taken from the intensity of the act, or from circumstances aggravating within the same species: therefore if God determines the created will to elicit this act of hatred, e.g., rather than another, He will determine it to some special malice and deformity, and consequently He will be the author of sin, or at least of some special malice included in it. We have pursued this argument more extensively in the treatise on the will of God. Hence we run through it here briefly, that we may proceed to others.

§ IX.
Another argument taken from the dominion of God over our wills.

We briefly and concisely touched on this argument, when attacking middle knowledge, and explaining the harmony of freedom with predestination; but now it must be weighed more extensively, and urged more.

LXXXIX. I propose it thus: To predetermine the will is to apply it to acting, or to eliciting a determinate act: but God applies the will to acting: therefore He also predetermines it. The major is clear from what was said above: for we showed that God through merely simultaneous concurrence, cannot apply secondary causes to acting. But the minor is persuaded: God has perfect dominion over our will, just as over other creatures, according to that of Esther 13: "You are the Lord of all": therefore He applies it to acting. The antecedent is certain, since the dominion of God is founded on creation and conservation, and the will does not need to be created and conserved by God less than other things of the universe. But the consequence is shown thus. The use of a thing is the proper act of dominion, which is therefore defined as the faculty of using a thing in all uses permitted by law: "But the use of something, is nothing other than the application of that thing to operation," says St. Thomas below in Question 16, article 1: therefore if God has perfect dominion over our wills, He applies them to acting.

XC. This is confirmed: For this reason our will applies the inferior powers to their acts, because it is their mistress and queen, as St. Thomas teaches here in Question 9, article 1: but God more perfectly has dominion over our will, than it over the inferior powers: therefore a fortiori He must apply the will to acting.

XCI. Adversaries respond, that God morally applies the will, inviting and exciting it to willing, and operating, but does not physically pre-move it: just as, they say, the will itself does not physically, but morally move and apply the inferior powers, by reason of the sympathy and connection of the powers in the same soul.

XCII. But against, first: It is false that the will does not physically move and apply the inferior powers, as we showed in the preceding disputation, article 1, and as is openly gathered from St. Thomas in Part 1, Question 82, article 4, where he says: "The will moves the intellect and other powers, as what alters moves what is altered, and what impels moves what is impelled," all of which pertains to physical motion.

XCIII. Against, secondly: Granted that the will moves and applies the inferior powers to their operations only morally, it is not rightly inferred from this that God moves and

applies the will to acting only morally: both because God and the created will are not conjoined in the same supposit, nor rooted in the same soul, like the will and the inferior powers; hence God cannot through mere and sole sympathy, and without the impression of some power or motion, apply the will to acting; just as according to the opinion of some, the will by reason of sympathy and connection alone, or being rooted in the same soul, applies the inferior powers, without impressing something real on them, and changing them physically. And also, because since God more perfectly has dominion over our will, than the will over the inferior powers, and the proper act of dominion is the use and application of the thing, God must move and apply it in a nobler and higher way, and therefore physically, and not only morally.

XCIV. Thirdly: From St. Thomas in Question 22 on Truth, article 8: "Just as the will can change its act to something else, so and much more can God": but the will not only morally, but also physically applies itself to acting, and moves from one act to another, without violence and injury to freedom: therefore much more can God do this. Hence the same Holy Doctor from that verse of Proverbs 21: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord: whithersoever He will He shall turn it," proves in Against the Gentiles 3, chapter 88, that God alone "Can move the will by way of an agent," that is truly efficiently, as is distinguished against moral motion, as is gathered from the fourth argument, where, explaining what it is to be moved by way of an agent, he says: "I say to be moved by an extrinsic principle which moves by way of an agent, and not by way of an end." Therefore St. Prosper in his poem on the ungrateful, declaring the efficacity of divine grace, teaches that it does not move by counsels and persuasions alone, but changes and reforms the mind of man internally.

"Not these by counsel only, and kindly exhortation, Persuading and teaching, as if it had the standard of law Grace, but changing the mind within, and reforming, And fashioning a new vessel from the broken one, by the power of creating."

Likewise St. Bernard cited above says, that God "applies the will to work, and explains the work to the will." By which words he openly declares both motions, namely physical, when he says that "He applies the will to work"; and moral, when he adds, "and explains the work to the will," that is, He shows it the suitability and goodness of the object or work, which pertains to moral motion.

XCV. Fourthly, If God could only morally move and apply the will, and excite it only by counsels and persuasions, He would have over it only political and civil dominion, but not royal and monarchical; which seems absurd, because according to Augustine, God "has most omnipotent power of inclining hearts," and has the wills of men more in His

power, than men themselves, and "to Him willing to save, no human choice resists." Likewise Scripture in Proverbs 21 says: "As the divisions of waters, so the heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord: whithersoever He will He shall turn it." Where the power of inclining and drawing the human heart is openly attributed to the divine will, whithersoever He will, and that with the same ease and sweetness, with which streams of waters are led by human work in different directions without any violence, as Cajetan excellently declares there, with these words: "Solomon describes the efficacy together with the ease of divine operation for inclining the heart of man, whithersoever it may please God, like one dividing water into many streams. For the division of water into many streams is very easy, because water does not resist division. Just as therefore the operation of man is of the easiest efficacy for dividing water into many small streams, nor is it necessary to labor for such a division, although it may be necessary to labor to make the channels through which the water may be led; so God with the easiest efficacy moves the heart, and inclines it whithersoever He will, etc." And it should be noted that there special mention is made of the heart of the king, for this reason, that this is especially free, and less subject to the power of another: hence if God without any difficulty and resistance turns and inclines it whithersoever He will, much more will He turn all other hearts here and there according as He will, and supreme will be the power of the first heart over second hearts, and most perfect will be the dominion of God over our wills; and consequently the supreme and absolute power of moving and applying the will to whatever He will, with its freedom safe and uninjured: "For who," (says Augustine) "is so impiously foolish, that he would say that God cannot convert the evil wills of men, which He will, when He will, where He will, to good?"

XCVI. From these things you will understand, that Catholics and Heretics attribute an entirely different dominion to God over human hearts. For Pelagius recognized in God only moral motion, and consequently only political dominion: on the contrary Calvin attributed to God purely physical motion, and necessitating, and taking away the power to the opposite, and consequently violent and tyrannical dominion: but Catholics (especially the disciples of St. Augustine and St. Thomas) who recognize both motions (namely physical and moral) in God, attribute to Him royal and monarchical dominion, and teach that He "reaches from end to end mightily, and arranges all things sweetly."

§ X.

Theological arguments taken from the sufficiency and efficacy of grace.

XCVII. St. Prosper rightly says, or the author of the epistle to Demetrias, chapter 7: "The grace of God, unless it is wholly received, is wholly rejected: for just as he is alien to the

number of the faithful, and to the lot of the Saints, who dissents in anything from Catholic truth, so he is placed outside grace, who denies anything of its fullness." Moreover, this fullness, for the present state of human weakness, includes two prerogatives; one of which consists in the sufficiency of grace, the other in its energy or efficacy. Whoever therefore denies anything either of the sufficiency, or of the efficacy of Christian grace, is convicted of being entirely outside grace: because as we have already heard from Prosper: "This is wholly rejected, unless it is wholly received." If therefore we prove that with physical pre-motion removed, neither sufficient nor efficacious grace can stand, we will show a fortiori, that with it removed, the whole grace of God is rejected, and its attackers (to use Prosper's words) "are totally outside grace."

XCVIII. The first argument, which proceeds from sufficient grace, can be proposed thus. In order that the will may have sufficient aid for operating, and for eliciting supernatural acts of charity or contrition, it must be physically able to elicit them prior at least in nature than it operates: but with physical predetermination excluded, impressing some real and physical power of the supernatural order, the will cannot be physically able to elicit supernatural acts prior in nature than it operates: therefore with that removed, sufficient aids cannot be given. The major is clear: for the will influences supernatural acts not only morally, but also physically; and the first act, at least by priority of nature, precedes the second act or operation: therefore in order that the will may have sufficient aid for eliciting supernatural acts, it must be physically able to act prior in nature than it operates. But the minor, in which is the difficulty, is shown thus. With physical predetermination removed, there only remains moral motion, or grace morally exciting, and simultaneous concurrence of the supernatural order, which by some is called the grace of co-efficiency: for we suppose that those acts of charity and contrition precede justification, and are elicited by a sinner destitute of the supernatural habits of grace and charity: but neither moral motion, nor simultaneous concurrence, can render the will physically able prior in nature than it operates: therefore with physical predetermination removed, the will cannot be prior in nature than it operates, physically able to elicit supernatural acts. The major is clear, the minor as to both parts is persuaded. In the first place, moral motion, since it does not change the will physically, and does not impress any power on it, but only extrinsically and objectively, through the showing of the goodness and suitability which is in the object, allures it, as we declared above; cannot render the will of the sinner physically able to elicit supernatural acts of charity and contrition; for what is of itself impotent, cannot be rendered physically able, unless it is physically changed, or receives some physical power, which it did not have before: similarly also simultaneous concurrence, since it does not relate to the first act, but the second; nor does it precede the operation of the secondary cause by priority of nature; nor

does it influence the cause itself, but only its effect; cannot elevate the will to elicit supernatural acts, nor render it physically able to act, prior in nature than it operates: therefore neither moral motion, nor simultaneous concurrence, can render the will physically able in first act to supernatural acts of charity and contrition, nor give it sufficient aid for operating: hence either physical pre-motion must be admitted, or sufficient aids must be removed.

XCIX. It is amazing how much this argument tortures the minds of adversaries, and compels them to adopt various ways of speaking. In the first place, some say that the will of the sinner, destitute of the supernatural habits of grace and charity, is elevated and rendered able to elicit supernatural acts of charity and contrition, through certain sudden and indeliberate motions which God operates in us without us. Others think that it is elevated, and made able by the special assistance of God; others by the practical command of God; others finally by the simultaneous concurrence of God, not as exercised, because as such it relates to the second act, but as offered, or as Suarez says, insofar as God is prepared to give it.

C. All these things, however, do not weaken the force of the proposed argument, but rather strengthen it. For first I ask the adversaries, whether those indeliberate acts, in which they place exciting and sufficient grace, are natural or supernatural? If they are natural, they cannot render the will able to elicit supernatural acts of charity and contrition, nor have the account of sufficient grace, since that is intrinsically supernatural. But if it is said, that they are supernatural, the difficulty of the proposed argument returns: for since the will is a purely natural power, it cannot of itself be physically able, prior in nature than it operates, to elicit them; hence in order that it may become physically able, either it must be changed by another indeliberate act (about which I will ask the same as about the former, and thus there will be a process to infinity) or some physical and supernatural motion must be admitted, which elevates the will, and renders it physically able prior in nature than it operates, and consequently physical pre-motion must be admitted.

CI. Secondly: Those indeliberate acts (granted that they are supernatural) are nevertheless less perfect, and of a different species from those perfectly supernatural acts, for eliciting which the will is excited: for God usually excites and moves the will of the sinner to an act of contrition, or of the love of God above all things by some vivid representation of death, or fear of hell; which is much nobler and more excellent, and of a different species from the act of fear: therefore such indeliberate acts cannot render the will physically and completely able to elicit acts of contrition and charity. The consequence is clear: because

the whole perfection of the second act, must be virtually or eminently pre-contained in the first act, and consequently the latter must surpass, or at least equal the former in perfection. Hence just as a twig of a chestnut, e.g., cannot render a wild tree, to which it is grafted, able to produce apples, or pears, which are nobler fruits, and of a different species from chestnuts; so it seems impossible that an act of fear should render the will physically able to elicit an act of charity, but for this there is necessarily required a certain supernatural power, impressed on the will, prior at least in nature than it operates, virtually containing the perfection which is found in the act of charity.

CII. Thirdly: Either from the special assistance of God, His command, or the offering of simultaneous concurrence, some intrinsic power is derived in the will, or none is superadded to it. If the first is said, we have our intention: for such superadded power, since it is prior in nature to the operation itself of the will, and is not permanent, but transient and flowing, will be physical pre-motion itself. If the second is affirmed, it follows that from such assistance, command, and offering of concurrence, the will cannot become intrinsically able to elicit acts of charity and contrition: because it is impossible that that which is of itself impotent and unproportioned to produce some effect, or to elicit some operation, be rendered physically able and proportioned to it, unless it receives in itself some form, or power which it did not have before; for for a cause to be physically able, is not some extrinsic denomination, but intrinsic, sought from some power and internal principle; hence it is commonly said: The same remaining the same, always does the same.

CIII. This is confirmed: That by which the will from being impotent becomes proximately and completely able to elicit some operation, must be an operative form; because its formal effect is to constitute the subject in first act, and proximately operative: but God cannot have the account of form and first act (at least in entitative being) with respect to the creature, as Theologians commonly teach in Part 1, Question 12, article 5, where by this argument they prove that God cannot immediately through Himself supply the light of glory in the created intellect, although He can play the role of impressed species and intelligible form: therefore God cannot through special assistance alone, command, or offering of simultaneous concurrence, render the created will proximately able to elicit supernatural acts. See what we said in the treatise on the beatific vision, where with various arguments we showed that the created intellect cannot be elevated and made able to see God, through His assistance alone, or simultaneous concurrence, but the light of glory communicated by way of habit or aid is necessarily required: for these arguments prove the same thing about the created will, with respect to the act of charity and contrition; especially that which we took from the Holy Doctor in Against the

Gentiles 3, chapter 55, where he reasons thus: "Nothing can be elevated to a higher operation, except by this, that its power is strengthened. But it happens in two ways that the power of something is strengthened; in one way by simple intensification of the power itself, as the active power of what is hot is increased by the intensification of heat, so that it can effect a more vehement action in the same species: in another way by the addition of a new form; as the power of the transparent is increased so that it can illuminate, by this, that it becomes actually luminous, through the form of light received in it anew: and this increase of power is required for attaining an operation of another species, etc." Hence the argument can be formed thus. Whenever some power must elicit acts of a different species, and of a higher order than those which it elicits connaturally, it must be changed by the reception of a new form, which is also of a different species, and of a higher order than that which it has from its nature: but the acts of charity and contrition, which are elicited by a sinner not yet justified, and not yet adorned with the supernatural habits of grace and charity, are of another species, indeed of a higher order, than those which the created will according to its natural powers can elicit: therefore it must be changed intrinsically, by the reception of some supernatural power, motion, or quality, prior at least in nature than it operates, and consequently be physically pre-moved by God.

CIV. Moreover: Granted that by absolute power God could by Himself alone, without the impression of any form, quality, or active power, render the will intrinsically able to elicit supernatural acts: nevertheless it cannot be denied, that it is done more sweetly and more connaturally, by means of some quality, or supernatural active power, impressed on the will prior at least in nature than it operates: hence St. Thomas in Part 2-2, Question 25, article 2, teaches against the Master of the Sentences, that the motion of the love of God is not produced immediately by the Holy Spirit, inhabiting the mind of the just, but by means of some form, or created quality impressed on the will: "Because," he says, "no act is perfectly produced by any active power, unless it is connatural to it through some form, which is the principle of action": but we must always ascribe to God that which is sweeter, and more conformable to the natures of things; for as it is said in Wisdom 8: "He reaches from end to end mightily, and arranges all things sweetly": therefore it must be said, that God elevates the will of the sinner to elicit supernatural acts of charity and contrition, by means of some transient form or quality impressed on it, prior at least in nature than it operates; but not immediately through Himself, or through His special assistance, or simultaneous concurrence.

Besides that (as St. Thomas argues in the place cited Against the Gentiles, reason 3) if some two things will have been not united, and afterwards are united, it is necessary that

this be done through the change of both, or of one only: hence since God by concurring simultaneously with the human will for supernatural acts, is conjoined and assists it by way of co-principle, influencing simultaneously with it the same operation, some change must intervene; which since it cannot be held on the part of God, must be held on the part of the will; which therefore must receive something real and physical anew, prior at least in nature than it operates; which is for it to be physically pre-moved.

§ XI.

Another theological argument taken from the efficacy or efficiency of grace.

CV. This argument is the principal one and fundamental, and can be proposed thus briefly. God through preventing grace truly and properly effects in us the determination of the will to good, e.g., to believe the revealed mysteries, or to love God above all things: but He cannot do this, unless He physically pre-moves the will: therefore such pre-motion is given. The major is of faith: for it is certain by faith, that the beginning of justification in adults is to be taken from the preventing grace of God, as the Council of Trent defines in session 6, chapter 7. But the beginning of justification in adults begins from the determination of free choice, by which the infidel, e.g., determines himself to believe the mysteries revealed to him; hence in the chapter following it is added: "But they are disposed to that justice itself, while excited and aided by divine grace, conceiving faith from hearing, they are freely moved toward God, believing those things to be true which are divinely revealed and promised": therefore from the Council of Trent God through preventing grace truly and properly causes in us the determination of free choice to believe.

CVI. This is confirmed: The determination of the will to believe, or to love God above all things, is a certain beginning of faith and good will: for faith begins from the motion of the will, determining and applying the intellect to assent to the mysteries proposed to it, as we will show in the treatise on faith: but it is certain by faith, that there are given in us no beginnings of faith or good will, which are not from preventing grace; for so it has been defined against the Semi-Pelagians in several Councils, and Augustine, Prosper, Fulgentius, and other Holy Fathers everywhere teach. Hence Pope Leo in sermon 8 on the Epiphany: "With the Lord saying to His disciples, without me you can do nothing, there is no doubt that man doing good things, has from God both the effect of the work and the beginning of the will": therefore God through preventing grace, truly and properly effects in us the determination of the will to good.

CVII. But the minor, which adversaries deny, can be persuaded in multiple ways. First because moral motion is not true and proper efficiency, but only improper and metaphorical; and pertains more to the genus of final cause, than efficient; for it moves only objectively, and by showing to the will goodness which allures it by its suitability: hence orators do not truly and properly effect the motion of the will of hearers, because they move it morally only by persuading; the Devil also is not truly and properly the cause of the sin of man, because by counsels alone, persuasions, or the proposition of a delectable object, he moves his will to sin, as St. Thomas teaches below in Question 80, article 1, and in Question 3 on Evil, article 5. The same is clear from the example of a child, who is morally moved and excited to run, by the showing of an apple or image; for who would say that this moral excitation is truly and properly the efficient cause of his running? Therefore God through moral motion does not truly and properly effect the determination of our will to good, but must physically pre-move it, that He may truly and properly effect such determination.

CVIII. Secondly, the same minor is proved by the argument of St. Thomas in the place last cited. The efficient cause is that to which the effect infallibly follows: but to the action of one counselling, commanding, or persuading, the effect does not infallibly follow, namely the free consent of another; for persuasion does not compel the unwilling, as Augustine says in book 85 of questions, that is, it does not efficaciously determine him to act: therefore moral motion is not a true efficient cause, and consequently physical motion is required.

CIX. Thirdly, What does not exist, cannot truly and properly act; for the efficient cause operates insofar as it is in act: but it often happens that morally exciting grace does not exist, when the consent of the will and its operation is produced: therefore at least then it cannot be the true efficient cause of such consent. The major is clear, the minor is also clear by experience. For often when a sinner is converted, and begins to love God above all things, he does not feel in his soul those indeliberate motions of the fear of death or hell, e.g., in which adversaries place morally exciting grace.

CX. This is confirmed: The effective principle must be, or at least can be simultaneous with its effect, especially in instantaneous and immanent actions, such as are the acts of the intellect and will: but the indeliberate acts of the intellect and will cannot be simultaneously with the deliberate, when they are concerned with the same object (e.g., when God through an indeliberate act of love moves man to a deliberate act of perfect charity) for deliberate and indeliberate are opposed contrarily, or contradictorily, and

consequently exclude each other: therefore morally exciting grace cannot be the effective principle of the act of perfect charity.

CXI. Finally: The motion of exciting grace is usually less perfect, than the supernatural act to which it moves; for God, as we were saying above, usually excites sinners to an act of contrition or charity by some vivid representation of death, or fear of hell, which is of a higher order, and different species from the act of fear: but the principal efficient cause, must be at least equally perfect, as its effect; since the whole perfection of the effect is virtually contained in the cause: therefore morally exciting grace, is not, nor can be the true efficient cause of the act of charity, and of the determination of the will to believe, or to love God above all things.

CXII. You will say: Although God through preventing grace does not truly and properly and physically effect in us the determination of free choice to good; nevertheless He truly, properly, and physically causes it through the grace of cooperation and co-efficiency, or through simultaneous concurrence of the supernatural order, by which together with the will He influences its consent and determination.

CXIII. But against, first: The Council of Trent in the place cited teaches that the beginning of our justification (and consequently the determination of the will to believe, or to love God above all things, from which the justification of the sinner begins) proceeds from the grace of God moving and preventing: but the grace of cooperation and co-efficiency, neither prevents free choice, as is clear; otherwise it would be preventing grace, and not only cooperating and co-efficient; nor does it move it, as was shown in multiple ways in Section 1 against Suarez: therefore God through the grace of cooperation and co-efficiency does not effect in us the determination of free choice to good.

Then simultaneous concurrence, according to the principles of adversaries, is indifferent, or offered to the will in an indifferent way: therefore it is so far from truly and properly causing the determination of our will; rather it supposes or expects it from the will, that it may determinately influence our free acts; or that its indifference, suspension, and indetermination may be removed and resolved. About which we said more in the treatise on the will, disputation 5, attacking indifferent decrees.

§ XII.
Corollaries worthy of note.

CXIV. You will infer first from what has been said, that those denying physical predetermination destroy the whole order of actual grace. For since this order consists especially in sufficient and efficacious aids; but aids of this kind, with physical predetermination removed, cannot stand, as we have abundantly shown; certainly those who deny it, overturn the whole order of actual grace, and as St. Prosper related above says, "are totally outside grace."

CXV. You will infer secondly, that adversaries pave the way to this error of the Semi-Pelagians who asserted that there are given in us certain beginnings of faith and good will, which were not from grace, but from nature, nor from God, but from free choice.

This corollary is also clear: for the determination of the will to believe the revealed mysteries, or to love God above all things, is a certain beginning of faith and good will: but such determination cannot be truly and properly effected by grace merely morally exciting; for, as we saw above, moral excitation is not true and proper efficiency, but only improper and metaphorical; nor also by the grace of co-efficiency, or simultaneous concurrence of the supernatural order; since such concurrence does not prevent the determination of free choice, but supposes it, or expects it from the created will, as adversaries teach: therefore with physically predetermining grace removed, the determination of the will to believe, or to love God above all things, cannot truly and properly be caused by grace, and consequently must be reduced to nature alone as to the true and proper efficient cause.

CXVI. You will infer thirdly, that Yzambertus, and certain other Doctors of the Sorbonne, who admit grace efficacious of itself and from its nature, and deny that it physically predetermines free choice, do not speak consequently, but write and teach conflicting things.

This is briefly proved: Grace efficacious of itself and from its nature, must truly and properly effect the determination of free choice to good, e.g., to love God above all things, or to believe the revealed mysteries: but grace only morally moving and preventing the will, does not truly and properly effect the determination of free choice to good, but only improperly, and metaphorically; since moral motion is not true and proper efficiency, but only improper and metaphorical, and is reduced more to the genus of final cause than efficient, as we showed extensively in the preceding section: therefore grace

only morally moving and exciting the will, cannot be efficacious of itself and from its nature, but only accidentally, and from the event, as Molina and other more recent authors teach.

CXVII. This is confirmed first: Moral motion relates to the object, and is done through the showing of good, which allures and invites the will by its suitability: hence it is called objective, as we declared in the first note: but no purely moral motion can be of itself and from its nature efficacious.

The minor is proved from St. Thomas in Part 1, Question 105, article 4, in the body, where he reasons thus: "For nothing can sufficiently move some mobile, unless the active power of the mover exceeds or at least equals the passive power of the mobile: but the passive power of the will extends to universal good, just as the object of the intellect is universal being: but any created good is a certain particular good, but God alone is universal good; hence He alone fulfills the will, and sufficiently moves it as object." By which words he openly declares, that no created good, however congruously proposed to the will, can from its own power efficaciously move and determine it to love itself, but this belongs to the infinite and universal good alone, clearly and intuitively known. Hence God, as He is obscurely and enigmatically known by us wayfarers through faith, cannot efficaciously move the will in the account of object: because then He is not apprehended as universal good, containing in Himself every account of good, but sometimes is represented as inflicting the evil of punishment, or prohibiting some delectable good, to which the will is inclined, which consequently can pursue Him with hatred, or not love Him; and therefore no motion relating to the object in this state of the way, can be efficacious of itself and from its nature and infallible, or infallibly move the will.

CXVIII. This is confirmed secondly: That which efficaciously moves the will to act, must move and determine it, not only as to specification, but also as to exercise: since it is repugnant that the will operate, unless it elicit some act in particular: but no created object, however congruously proposed to the will, nor even God Himself, as He is obscurely known by us here on the way through faith; nor good as such, or happiness in general, can efficaciously and infallibly move and determine the will, as to the exercise of the act; but only as to specification, as Theologians teach with St. Thomas here in Question 9, article 1, and is clear from what was said in the preceding disputation: therefore no purely moral and objective motion, can be efficacious of itself and from its nature.

CXIX. This is confirmed thirdly: Moral motion behaves by way of persuasion: but no motion behaving by way of pure persuasion, can be through itself and from its nature efficacious: therefore neither can any moral motion. The major is clear, the minor is proved from St. Thomas in Part 1, Question 111, article 2, where he says: "God alone can efficaciously move the will; but an Angel and a man, by way of persuading": therefore from St. Thomas motion which behaves by way of persuasion, is not of itself efficacious and infallible. Hence the same Holy Doctor in Against the Gentiles 3, chapter 92, says, that "The action of an Angel operates something to the choice of man, by way of persuading": from which he infers afterwards, "That since the disposition which is from the persuasion of the intellect, does not induce necessity to choosing, man does not always choose what the guardian Angel intends, but always man chooses what God operates in his will." By which words he openly declares, that God efficaciously and infallibly moves the will, because He moves it physically, and by operating something in it: but an Angel on the contrary cannot move it efficaciously, because he moves it only morally, and by way of persuading: and consequently according to the principles of St. Thomas, no purely moral and objective motion can be efficacious of itself and from its nature. Therefore St. Prosper in the verses related above in Section 8, weighing the efficacity of divine grace, says that it does not move by counsels and persuasions alone, but changes and reforms the mind of man internally. And St. Bernard brought forth above, says that it "applies the will to work, and explains the work to the will."

CXX. You will infer finally, that with middle knowledge removed, physical predetermination is necessarily to be admitted; and consequently all arguments, by which we demonstrated the impossibility of this knowledge in the treatise on the knowledge of God, establish the necessity of physical predetermination.

This corollary is briefly proved, and the connection which is found between these two celebrated questions, or between the destruction of middle knowledge, and the position of physical predetermination, is shown. With middle knowledge removed, by which God in a sign of reason antecedent to His decree, foreknows our free acts conditionally future, in their objective truth, or in the comprehension of the human will, a predetermining decree must necessarily be admitted, in which as in a medium He can certainly and infallibly know the same acts: therefore with middle knowledge removed, physical predetermination must necessarily be posited. The consequence is clear: because physical predetermination is the execution, or executive of the predetermining decree, and, as it were, a little stream proceeding from that fountain. But the antecedent is shown thus. Contingent futures cannot be known except in a twofold way, namely either in themselves, by reason of the determinate truth which they have in themselves, or in their

causes; among which the principal is the divine decree, which is the first root of all existence and futurity, since nothing is done in the nature of things, or will be future, except dependently on God freely willing, or on the free determination of the divine will: but the divine decree cannot be the cause of the futurity and existence of our free acts, unless it is predetermining: therefore with middle knowledge removed, by which God in a sign of reason antecedent to His decree knows contingent futures in their objective truth, a predetermining decree must necessarily be admitted, in which as in a medium He can know them. The major and the consequence are clear. The minor is also evident: both because every cause is prior at least in nature and causality to its effect: and also because a purely indifferent decree, and determinable by the human will as to the species of the act (such as the defenders of middle knowledge feign in God) does not cause, but supposes, or expects the free determination of our will: therefore in order that the divine decree be the root and cause of the determinate futurity of our free acts, it must necessarily be predetermining the will, and not purely indifferent, and determinable by it, as to the species of the act.

§ XIII.

The testimonies of St. Thomas, which Peter of St. Joseph objects to us in the work which he calls "A Defense of St. Thomas," are explained.

CXXI. Before I present the testimonies of the Angelic Doctor, which might cause some difficulty to those who are not well-versed in his doctrine, I have thought it necessary to warn the erudite Reader, that it should in no way seem strange, if something apparently contrary to the doctrine so often and so evidently explained and confirmed by him, is found in the Holy Doctor. For since the Holy Teacher has written so many and such great volumes, and has treated the present question so many times (a question "So difficult to discern," says Augustine, "that when free choice is defended, the grace of God seems to be denied; but when the grace of God is asserted, free choice is thought to be taken away") it is, I say, not strange, if somewhere he seems to have said something, which can be distorted by adversaries in favor of, or rather in flattery of free choice, against the efficacy and causality of divine aid. Hence it is permitted to say of St. Thomas, what Facundus Hermianensis at the beginning of his book against Morianum excellently warned about St. Augustine: "Why," he says, "should we wonder at this?" (namely if what St. Augustine said aptly in a place, is distorted to meanings most foreign to his mind) "For he could not speak better than the Prophets, than the Apostles, than the Evangelists; by whose words similarly badly understood, and incongruously applied, so many Heretics try to defend their errors." With this as a preface, I will briefly relate and explain here the testimonies of St. Thomas, which Peter of St. Joseph objects to us in the

work which he calls "A Defense of St. Thomas," which he has diligently collected from Suarez, Ruiz, and other more recent authors, and reduced to order. I will omit only those which contain no appearance of difficulty: lest we should dwell on useless things, and cause tedium and trouble to the studious Reader.

CXXII. Therefore the aforesaid author objects in disputation 1, section 4, from the Holy Doctor, four things which seem adverse to physical predetermination. In the first place, St. Thomas in Opuscule 6, question 38, teaches that this proposition: "God does not act in the soul, except through a new influx": is false. And in Question 22 on Truth, article 8, he asserts that God sometimes moves the will without impressing anything on it: but (says the adversary) he would not assert these things, if he thought that the secondary cause always needs for operating the previous motion of God received in it: therefore he did not teach such motion.

CXXIII. Secondly: The same Holy Doctor in Part 1, Question 103, article 1, in reply to the 3rd objection, establishes this difference between an emitted arrow, and an operating creature, that the arrow receives an impulse superadded to its nature itself, and relating to violence; but what creatures receive from God, is their nature. By which words he seems to deny in creatures any motion, distinct from that natural and intrinsic inclination, by which they tend to their operations, and which was put into them in their production by the author of nature.

CXXIV. Thirdly, Whenever the same Holy Doctor hands down the division of act, he divides it adequately into first and second: but this division would not be adequate, if physical predetermination were given: for it would be neither first act, nor second, as being distinct from operative power, and operation itself: therefore it would be a third act.

CXXV. Fourthly, St. Thomas sometimes asserts, that the universal concurrence of God is modified and determined by secondary causes: but this would be false, if He were to physically predetermine them to acting: therefore physical predetermination seems to be adverse to the principles of the doctrine of St. Thomas.

CXXVI. But nevertheless these points press little, and can easily be removed. For to the first it is responded, that St. Thomas only intends, that God does not always move the soul or will, by influencing or impressing on it the habitual gifts of grace and charity, but sometimes moves it by actual aids alone, as he clearly explains himself in the cited places; for he says in the aforesaid opuscule, after the words related by the adversary: "For it is manifest that God acts in the soul, not only by causing in it some habit, such as of grace, or virtue, but also by inclining free choice to this or that, which is not properly

called influencing, but rather moving to act." And in the cited question on truth, after he said: "Just as the will can change its act to something else, so and much more can God," he immediately adds: "But He changes the will in two ways; in one way by only moving, namely when He moves the will to willing something, without impressing any form on the will, as without the addition of any habit He sometimes makes man will what he did not will before; in another way by impressing some form on the will itself: just as from nature itself, which God gave to the will, the will is inclined to willing something; so from something superadded, such as grace, or virtue, it is further inclined to willing something else, to which it was not determined before, by natural inclination." From which doctrine it is so far from the case that anything can be inferred against us; rather by it our opinion is more established and strengthened: both because the Holy Doctor says, that "Just as the will can change its act to something else, so and much more can God"; and therefore just as the will physically moves itself from one act to another, without injury to freedom; so and a fortiori God can, with its freedom uninjured, physically pre-move it, or change it from one act to another, as we were arguing above: and also, because St. Thomas there says, that God by moving free choice, makes man will what he did not will before: but through simultaneous concurrence God does not move free choice, nor make man will, as was shown above: therefore St. Thomas in the same places, which the adversary opposes to us, not obscurely teaches physical predetermination, so far is it from being the case that he is adverse to it.

CXXVII. To the second it must be said, that there is talk there of the institution and constitution of nature in first act, beyond which determination it needs motion applying it to second act, as St. Thomas teaches here in Question 109, article 1, where he says: "The action of the intellect and of any created being depends on God in two ways, in one way insofar as it has from Him the perfection or form by which it acts, in another way insofar as it is moved by Him to acting." And in Question 3 on Power, article 7, in reply to the 7th objection: "Natural power," he says, "which is conferred on natural things in their institution, is in them as a certain form having fixed and settled being in nature: but that which God does in them that they may actually operate, has a certain incomplete being, in the way that colors are in the air, and the power of art in the instrument of the craftsman." It is false, therefore, what Peter of St. Joseph says, that "No motion is given in creatures, distinct from that natural and intrinsic inclination, by which they tend to their operations, and which was put into them in their production." Hence St. Thomas in the places cited above, especially in the cited question on power, teaches that God moves secondary causes to operating, not only because He gave them operative powers, and preserves them, but also because He applies them to acting.

This testimony is so clear and perspicuous, that Suarez, the leader of the adversaries, and most sagacious in eluding the testimonies of St. Thomas, could find no escape at all, but was forced to concede in the book on the concurrence of God, chapter 11, that Thomas in that place truly taught physical pre-motion. He adds, however, that the Holy Doctor, having become more expert, in both his summaries (Theological, namely, and Against the Gentiles) which, he says, "are as it were his final testament," virtually retracted himself; insofar as in Part 1, Question 105, article 5 in the body, speaking of the way in which God concurs with secondary causes, after he proved that God can be called the cause of the actions of creatures, both insofar as He produced the operative powers of secondary causes, and insofar as He preserves them, he adds in the third place, "and Insofar as He As it were applies them to operation, as a craftsman applies an ax to cutting": for that particle "As it were," is diminutive, and indicates that God does not truly and properly pre-move and apply secondary causes to operating, but only similitudinarily and metaphorically.

Indeed the sagacity of this author is amazing, and his diligence in weighing and elucidating the words of St. Thomas. But I ask why he was not equally exact and religious in weighing the testimonies of Scripture? Why does he similarly not deny that Christ is truly the Only-begotten Son of God, because St. John testifies that he saw His glory "As it were of the Only-begotten" from the Father? Why also does he not deny that there is true fire in purgatory, because St. Paul in 1 Corinthians 3 says about him who builds hay and stubble: "He shall be saved, yet so as by fire": which place is almost the only one in Sacred Scripture, from which the faithful infer that there is true fire in purgatory. I also wonder that the aforesaid author did not notice that St. Thomas in the same cited article of Part 1 in reply to the 5th objection, having left out that particle, "As it were," says absolutely, and in formal words, that "God not only gives forms to things, but also preserves them in being, and applies them to acting." Which he had expressed in the same way in book 3 Against the Gentiles, chapter 70, and everywhere in all his works, with that particle, "As it were," always omitted.

Moreover if someone should ask, why St. Thomas in the body of the said article from the first part, added that particle, the reason is at hand, because there he compares the motion of God in creatures, with the motion of the craftsman, with respect to the knife: hence to indicate that in this example there is not found complete parity, but some dissimilarity (for the knife, and other instruments of arts, are so moved and applied by the craftsman, that they do not move and apply themselves; but created agents, if they are living and free, are so moved by God, that nevertheless they move and apply themselves, as the same Holy Doctor declares in Part 1, Question 105, article 4, in reply to the 2nd

objection, where he says: "To be moved of itself, is not repugnant to that which is moved by another") to indicate, I say, this difference, which is found between instruments of art and secondary causes, he added that particle "As it were." Hence the same Holy Doctor in Question 24 on Truth, article 1, in reply to the 3rd objection, has this: "An instrument is said in two ways; in one way properly, when indeed something is so moved by another, that no principle of such motion is conferred on it by the mover; as a saw is moved by a carpenter, and such an instrument lacks freedom: in another way an instrument is said more commonly, whatever is a mover moved by another, whether there is in it the principle of its motion, or not; and thus from the instrument it is not necessary that freedom be entirely excluded, because something can be so moved by another, that nevertheless it moves itself, and so it is with the human mind."

Therefore even Suarez himself finally saw the defect and absurdity of the response brought forward, after some time, or at least he who under the name of Suarez, published at Lyons in the year 1651 the tome on aids, which is the second of the tripartite work. For in book 3 of that tome, chapter 38, when he had to respond to that authority cited from Question 5 on Power, and to other similar ones which occur everywhere in St. Thomas, he did not dare to stand by his first solution: because he recognized that it was contrary not only to Capreolus, and all the ancient disciples of St. Thomas, who all use both the authority of that article, and the same way of speaking, but also that it is rejected by all Doctors, as ridiculous and fictitious, and is refuted by the most manifest arguments: but, retracting what he had said in book 1 on the concurrence of God, chapter 11, namely that St. Thomas retracted himself in the Theological Summa, he tries to explain his mind, recurring to the common solution of others, who say that the Holy Doctor understood by the name of motion and application simultaneous concurrence; which solution, however, we refuted above in Section 1 with the most evident testimonies of St. Thomas, and which even Suarez himself in the cited place on the concurrence of God (doubtless recognizing its falsity) had not dared to hand down, but had fabricated another already impugned, indeed finally reprobated by himself.

CXXVIII. To the third it is responded, with the major granted, by denying the minor: for although physical predetermination is not first act, nor second, nevertheless it is not a third act, but something mediating between first act and second, and behaving by way of nexus and bond joining both together: just as the mode of union, which some admit between matter and form, is not some third part distinct from the others, but some intermediate nexus joining both together.

CXXIX. To the fourth it must be said, that when St. Thomas asserts that the motion or concurrence of God is modified, or determined by secondary causes, he only intends to teach, that God adapts and accommodates His concurrence, and His motion to the natures of things, which He moves and applies to acting; so that He moves natural and necessary causes to one by way of nature, not leaving in them the power to the opposite, because their nature does not demand it; but free causes He predetermines to one by way of freedom, leaving the power to the opposite, and presupposing in the intellect the objective indifference of judgment, which is the proximate root of freedom; and this is for God to be determined by secondary causes materially and objectively; which does not prevent Him, by His motion and concurrence in the genus of efficient cause, from pre-moving them to acting, and physically predetermining them, conformably to their condition and nature. Hence divine motion does not prevent free causes from operating contingently and freely, but rather effects this in them, as St. Thomas lucidly expounds in Part 1, Question 83, article 1, in reply to the 3rd objection, saying: "God is the first cause moving both natural causes and voluntary; and just as by moving natural causes, He does not take away, that their acts are natural; so by moving voluntary causes, He does not take away, that their actions are voluntary, but rather effects this in them: for He operates in each thing, according to its property."

From which it is clear, that what the adversary objects in section 2 of the same opuscule is frivolous and futile, where he reasons thus: if God were to predetermine secondary causes to acting, no contingent effects would be given: because (he says) this predetermining motion is of such a condition, that with it posited the effect necessarily follows, both in free causes, and in natural ones; so that it cannot not be.

CXXX. He adds, that according to St. Thomas, irrational creatures are moved necessarily to their acts, but rational ones voluntarily and freely, and as having dominion over those acts to which they are moved; but this difference is assigned in vain, if both rational and irrational creatures are physically predetermined to all their acts: for just as in that hypothesis fire, e.g., without predetermining motion cannot act, and with it cannot not act; so (he says) man cannot elicit any act, if he lacks predetermination, but with it posited, he cannot not operate: where therefore will the difference assigned by St. Thomas have place, and how with the motion of God posited, will the will still retain dominion over its proper act.

He adds also, that St. Thomas frequently teaches, that contingent futures cannot be certainly known in their causes, and everywhere recurs to their existence in eternity, according to which he says that they are present to the divine sight from eternity: but if

man is physically predetermined to his acts, since with that predetermination posited, it is necessary in the composite sense that he operate, and it is impossible absolutely that his operation be impeded, either by himself, or by any other cause; who would doubt that God in such most efficacious, and entirely ineluctable pre-motion, can certainly, indeed most certainly, see our future acts? Therefore St. Thomas does not recognize physical predetermination.

CXXXI. But these things, as I said, are of no strength. For to the first it is easily responded, that although predetermining motion is of such a condition and nature, that with it posited the effect necessarily or infallibly follows, both in free causes, and in natural ones, nevertheless in different ways; for it so moves and applies necessary causes to one by way of nature, that it leaves in them no power to the opposite, because their nature so requires; hence with it posited the effect follows necessarily, by absolute necessity, which takes away all freedom and contingency: but free causes it so impels to acting, that nevertheless it leaves in them the power to the opposite, because the nature and condition of the free cause demands this; therefore with it posited the effect follows necessarily by the necessity of infallibility only, which does not prejudice freedom and contingency. Hence St. Thomas in Question 22 on Truth, article 5, in reply to the 3rd objection, says thus: "Although the non-being of the effect of the divine will cannot simultaneously stand with the divine will, nevertheless the power of failing in the effect of the divine will, simultaneously stands with the divine will." And in 1 to Annibaldum, distinction 47, the sole question, article 4, in reply to the 2nd objection: "Although the contrary of that which is willed by God, cannot stand with the divine will; nevertheless the possibility to the contrary can stand with it, on account of the contingency of the middle cause; and this suffices for this, that the effect is contingent, and not necessary."

CXXXII. From this the solution to the second is clear, and the difference between rational and irrational creatures: for rational and free creatures, under predetermining motion retain the power to the opposite; and consequently actual dominion over their proper act which they so elicit, that they can not elicit it, or cease from it, by antecedent power, and in the divided sense; but not irrational and necessary creatures: for when fire, e.g., is moved to heating, or the sun to illuminating, it is so applied to this act, that under divine motion it does not retain power, even antecedent, or in the divided sense, to the negation of it, or to the opposite act. I said, "Under divine motion," because to be able not to act in the divided sense, is not to be able not to operate, with predetermining motion divided, removed, and, as it were, cast off (as the adversary wrongly supposes in the whole of that opuscule) but under the motion itself to retain the power to not acting, or to acting the opposite, as we have explained extensively elsewhere.

CXXXIII. To the third I respond, that when St. Thomas teaches that contingent futures cannot be certainly known in their causes, he speaks of causes considered according to themselves, and as they abstract from the divine predetermining (for thus they cannot be a medium leading to certain and infallible knowledge of contingent futures, as we showed against Molina in the treatise on the knowledge of God) but not of secondary causes, as they are under divine motion and predetermination, or as they are subordinated to the efficacious decree of the divine will: for thus they have the account of medium, in which God certainly and infallibly knows contingent futures, as St. Thomas teaches in Against the Gentiles 1, chapter 67, reason 3.

CXXXIV. Nor is it an obstacle that the same Holy Doctor in various places recurs to the presence of contingent futures in eternity: both because such presence by priority of nature supposes the predetermining decree of the divine will, by which these futures are transferred from the state of mere possibility to the state of determinate and infallible futurity, and is founded on it as on an a priori reason and virtual cause: and also, because by this he intends to declare, that the knowledge of God, with respect to contingent futures, is not abstractive, and of simple intelligence (such as is the knowledge of the Prophets) but intuitive and of vision, such as is the knowledge of a present thing. Or also he means to signify, that the knowledge of God with respect to contingent futures, is certain and infallible in all ways, and does not have certainty and infallibility only on the part of the medium in which it is founded (namely the predetermining decree) but also on the part of the object which it contemplates, which when it is known as present in eternity, by reason of such presence, has a certain special mode of certainty, which it does not have from the efficacy and infallibility of the divine decree, as we explained extensively in the treatise on the knowledge of God.

§ XIV.
Other testimonies of St. Thomas are explained.

CXXXV. The adversary objects in section 3 a difficult testimony of St. Thomas, taken from this part, Question 9, article 6, in reply to the 5th objection, where, explaining in what way God moves the will of man to acting, and nevertheless is not the cause of sin, he says thus: "God moves the will of man, as universal mover, to the universal object of the will, which is the good, and without this universal motion man cannot will anything: but man through reason determines himself to willing this or that, which is truly good or apparently good; but nevertheless sometimes God specially moves some to willing determinately something, which is good, as in those whom He moves through grace, as will be said below." In which words (adds Peter of St. Joseph) three things must be

weighed. The first is, that God moves the will of man, as universal mover, to universal good; because He gives it a natural inclination to such good. The second, man from the proper judgment of reason determines himself to willing this or that good, whether true, or apparent; that is both to the good act, and to the evil, so that to neither is he determined from elsewhere. The third, that although the will determines itself to willing this or that; nevertheless sometimes on account of the special exigency of the thing, God moves some through grace to willing determinately something, as when God excites man to an act of contrition or love of God. But these things openly impugn physical predetermination, according to which the will is inclined and determined by God, not only to good in general, but also to particular goods, both as to specification, and as to exercise: nor is some pre-motion specially required only for good acts of the supernatural order; but it is also said to be generally necessary from the office of the first cause, and on account of the indifference of the will to all natural acts, whether they are good, or evil.

CXXXVI. To this celebrated testimony of St. Thomas the adversary adds two others taken from book 2 of the sentences. The first is contained in distinction 25, question 1, article 1, in reply to the 3rd objection, where the Holy Doctor says thus: "The determination of action and of the end is constituted in the power of free choice, hence there remains to it dominion over its act." From which it is clear, that God so operates with free choice, that He leaves to it the faculty of determining itself, and dominion over its act: but He would leave neither, if He were to predetermine it to acting; for how can it determine itself, if it is predetermined by another to such an action in species and number? how also can dominion over its act be left to it, if with predetermination posited it is necessary that man act to what he is impelled, nor can he suspend such an act?

CXXXVII. The other testimony he takes from distinction 28 of the same book, question 1, article 1, where St. Thomas writes thus: "Man would not be of free choice, unless the determination of his work pertained to him, so that from proper judgment he might choose this or that." But he who chooses something from physical predetermination, does not choose it from proper judgment: unless you say that physical predetermination is the proper judgment of the one operating: therefore such predetermination is not in agreement with the mind of the Holy Doctor.

This is confirmed: To choose something from proper judgment, is to choose it with the power of not choosing it: but he who from predetermination chooses something, does not have the power of not choosing it; for power is not given to the impossible, but only to that which can be done: therefore he does not choose from proper judgment.

CXXXVIII. To the first I respond that St. Thomas there only establishes a difference between the motion of God in relation to good as such, and in relation to particular goods; consisting in this, that He adequately applies and determines the will to the first, the will itself only eliciting concurring; but in relation to particular goods, the created will concurs not only elicitively, but also applicatively, by applying and determining itself; not indeed as the first applying and determining, but as the second, and consequently under the motion, application, and predetermination of God as the first moving, applying, and predetermining from which it does not follow that it is not predetermined by God to the volition of particular goods, but rather the opposite, as will be clear below.

That this interpretation is legitimate, is clear, because St. Thomas in the cited place refers himself to the treatise on grace, namely to Question 111, as is noted in the margin: but there in article 2, explaining what operating and cooperating grace is, he says thus: "In that effect in which our mind is moved and not moving, but God alone moving, the operation is attributed to God, and according to this it is called operating grace: but in that effect in which our mind both moves and is moved, the operation is not only attributed to God, but also to the soul, and according to this it is called cooperating grace." By which words he openly teaches, that God in the first volition of the end so moves and applies the will, that it itself concurs only elicitively, not however applicatively to such an act; hence in such an act it cannot sin, otherwise sin would be attributed to God, as we showed in the preceding disputation: but in the volition of particular goods the will is not adequately applied by God, but is so moved, applied, and determined by Him, that in its own order, and as second free, it moves, applies, and determines itself; and therefore in such an act it can sin, and fail from the rules of morals. Hence St. Thomas through this response and doctrine rightly solves this argument, which he had objected to himself, namely: "God is not the cause except of goods: but if the will were moved by God alone, it would never be moved to evil": for although the will is moved by God alone as first cause and general mover, not only to the volition of good in general, but also to the volition of particular goods: because nevertheless in its own order, and as second free, it moves, applies, and determines itself to willing this or that particular good, true, or apparent, it can sin, and withdraw itself from the rectitude of divine motion: just as because a scribe so moves and applies the hand of a child to writing, that nevertheless he moves and applies himself, in his writing there can be found deformity, and defect; which must be reduced not to the master applying, but to the child writing.

CXXXIX. But the adversary insists: St. Thomas in the cited place says: "Nevertheless sometimes God specially moves some to willing determinately something which is good,

as in those whom He moves through grace": but this would be false, if God not only to good in general, but also to all particular goods determined the will: therefore according to St. Thomas, God does not predetermine the will to the volition of all particular goods.

CXL. I respond that St. Thomas by those words only wanted to signify, that besides the general motion, by which God moves and applies the will, and all other secondary causes, whether natural, or free, and which pertains to the universal providence of God, and causality; there is given another special one in the order of grace, which extends itself only to supernatural acts, and pertains to God as special mover and provider, as he teaches in Question 109, article 1, which is cited in the margin.

CXLI. To the second we responded extensively in the treatise on the will of God. Now I say briefly, that although God as first mover, and first free, pre-moves and predetermines the will to operating, nevertheless this does not prevent the will in its own order, and as second mover and second free, from moving and determining itself: "For to be moved of itself, is not repugnant to that which is moved by another," says St. Thomas in Part 1, Question 105, article 4, in reply to the 2nd objection. Hence just as we see that the generation of a plant proceeds from the sun, as first generating and altering, but from the earth as second generating, and dependent on the influx of heavenly bodies; so similarly the determination of free choice is produced by God as first moving and applying, and by the created will, as second free and moving. Similarly also the supreme dominion, which God in the account of first cause has in our free acts, does not prevent the will from having in them inferior dominion, and subordinated to God: just as, as we were saying above, the supreme dominion of the King does not destroy the useful and inferior dominion, which the Vassal has in his estate. And therefore St. Thomas rightly says, that "The determination of action is constituted in the power of free choice, and that there remains to it dominion over its act"; but he adds: "Although not as to the first agent." By which words (which Peter of St. Joseph deliberately omitted) he openly declares, that the determination of our will, is not so in the power of the will itself, that it does not also descend from the supreme power of God, that causing it: because the dominion which the will has over its acts, is not supreme, like that which belongs to the first agent. Hence the same Holy Doctor in Question 5 on Power, article 7, in reply to the 13th objection, says: "The will is said to have dominion over its act, not by the exclusion of the first cause; but because the first cause does not so act in the will, as to determine it to one from necessity, as it determines nature, and therefore the determination of the act is left in the power of reason and will."

In which place also he openly teaches, that the dominion which the will has over its free acts, does not exclude all predetermination, but only that which is by way of nature, and which takes away the indifference of judgment, and the power to the opposite: otherwise he should not have added those words, "as to determine it to one from necessity," but simply assert, that God does not determine the will to one; the sense would have been plainer and clearer, as is clear: but about this there will be talk again below.

I add that the Holy Doctor in Part 1, Question 19, article 3, in reply to the 5th objection, establishes this difference between the first and second free, and between the divine and created will, that "The created will, since of itself it is contingent, must be determined by something exterior to the effect: but the divine will determines itself to the willed, to which it has a non-necessary relation." From which it is clear that it is false, and plainly repugnant to the mind of the Holy Doctor, what the adversary often repeats and inculcates in the aforesaid opuscule, namely that divine and created freedom agree in this, that just as God, precisely as He is free, is not determined to acting by another than Himself; so the creature, as it is free, so determines itself to acting, that for this, with its freedom preserved, it cannot be determined by another.

CXLII. The adversary insists, and says it is of the nature of dominion, that man can choose this or that: but he who is predetermined, is not indifferent that he choose this or that: therefore he does not have dominion over his acts. Suarez uses a similar discourse in book 3 on aids, chapter 42, number 8, where he says that from our opinion it follows, that the will never operates as indifferent to many things: for it is the same to be indifferent, as to be indeterminate: but the will never operates as indeterminate, because it always needs predetermination, as we say: therefore it never operates as indifferent.

CXLIII. But these authors are mistaken, for they do not distinguish the twofold indifference of the will: one is called potential or suspensive; because it expresses the absence or suspension of every act: the other is called actual and positive, by which the will so actually chooses and determines itself, that it retains the power to the opposite. Although therefore he who is predetermined to operating, is not indifferent by potential and suspensive indifference; because predetermination, which is a certain participation of divine actuality, takes away the suspension of the will, and removes from it (so to speak) the rust of potentiality; and consequently actuates and perfects it, by taking away from it some defect and imperfection, and reducing it from first act to second: nevertheless it always preserves under such predetermining motion, actual and positive indifference; because it so elicits the act to which it is predetermined, that it retains (even as it stands under that motion) power to the opposite, as we explained before: hence although it does

not then have potential dominion over the act which it elicits, it nevertheless has in it actual dominion, which is much more perfect; and therefore as it stands under divine pre-motion, it is in a more perfect way free, and mistress of its act, than it was before.

CXLIV. From which the response to the two proposed arguments is clear. For to the first I distinguish the major: it is of the nature of dominion that man can choose this or that: of the nature of potential dominion, I grant the major; of the nature of actual dominion, I deny the major, for it suffices for such dominion, that man so choose one, that he can choose another. To the second similarly I distinguish the major: it is the same to be indifferent, as to be indeterminate, by potential and suspensive indifference, I grant the major; by actual and positive indifference, I deny the major: for this last indifference implies the actual exercise, or determination of the will to one act, with the power to the negation or suspension of it, or to eliciting the opposite act.

CXLV. To the third testimony taken from distinction 28 of book 1 of the sentences, I deny that he, who chooses from predetermination, does not choose from proper judgment: for although predetermination is not the proper judgment of the one operating, nevertheless it causes and effects it; because in the same instant in which it moves and determines the will to choosing some work, it applies the intellect to the practical judgment, by which it judges such a work is here and now to be freely chosen: hence the will, which is a rational appetite, so chooses it, that nevertheless it preserves the power of not choosing it; not in the composite sense, but the divided, as we explained before. By which the response to the confirmation is clear.

CXLVI. Besides these testimonies, the adversary adduces in the same section 3, number 3, others in which the Holy Doctor teaches that the will so determines itself to the act, that it is not determined by another extrinsic agent, for he says in 2 Sentences, distinction 39, question 1, article 1: "The power itself of the will, as far as is in it, is indifferent to many things: but that it goes forth determinately into this act, or into that, is not from another determinately, but from the will itself." And in Question 5 on Evil, article 3, in reply to the 5th objection: "The will when it is to either alternative, is determined to one through something, namely through the counsel of reason, nor is it necessary for this to be through some extrinsic agent."

CXLVII. To these testimonies a twofold response can be given. The first is, that St. Thomas in these places is speaking of the determination of the will to moral evil, which is not from another, but from the will alone, as the first deficient cause, and operating in a deformed manner in relation to the rules of morals. That this interpretation is legitimate, is clear both from the title of that article first cited, in which the Holy Doctor asks,

"Whether there can be sin in the will?" And also from the argument which he objects to himself in the cited question on evil, which is of this kind: "Everything which is to either alternative, needs something determining, in order that it may go forth into act: but the free choice of man is to either alternative: therefore in order that it may go forth into the act of sin, it needs that it be determined to evil by something." Hence when the Holy Doctor there responds, that the will is determined by itself, and not by some extrinsic agent, it is manifest, that he is speaking of the determination of the will to sin and moral evil.

CXLVIII. The second solution is, that when St. Thomas says that the will is not determined by some extrinsic agent, he intends only that the created will is determined by no cause of the same order, or by no created agent, he does not however exclude the uncreated agent, which since it is the cause of the will itself, is not properly computed among extrinsic agents, as the same Holy Doctor teaches in the places related in Section 2. Likewise St. Bonaventure in 2 Sentences, distinction 25, question 5, posits a distinction between these three, the will to be induced, to be changed, and to be forced, and says that "The will can be induced by a created agent, but cannot be changed except by the uncreated agent, but cannot be forced by anything."

§ XV.
Other arguments are solved.

CXLIX. The adversary further objects in disputation 1, section 4, from St. Thomas in Part 1, Question 82, article 2, in reply to the 2nd objection: "The mover from necessity causes motion, when the mobile is entirely subject to it": but nothing is more frequently asserted by the Thomists, than that physically predetermining motion perfectly subjects the will to itself, namely so that not even as to use does the will subject that motion to itself: therefore predetermining motion from necessity causes the motion or act of the will.

CL. This is confirmed first: The same Holy Doctor there in Question 83, article 1, in reply to the 5th objection, teaches that "dispositions which are in the will do not take away freedom, because they are subject to the judgment of reason": but predetermining motion is not subject to the judgment of reason, nor is it in the power of the will to have it, or to repel it when had: therefore it takes away freedom.

CLI. This is confirmed secondly: St. Thomas in Question 22 on Truth, article 6, in the body, says: "From this something is said to be necessary, that it is immutably determined to one": and in Question 6 on Evil, the sole article, he teaches that what the will cannot

avoid is not free: but by reason of predetermination the will is immutably determined to one, and the act is rendered inevitable by it: therefore through it the will is necessitated.

CLII. This is confirmed thirdly: The same Holy Doctor there so excludes necessity from the will, that he wills the will, although moved by God, still to remain indifferent, and indeterminate to acting or not acting, for he says "Since God moves all things according to the condition of the mobiles, as light things upward, and heavy things downward, He also moves the will according to its condition, not of necessity, but as behaving indeterminately toward many things." Consequently therefore he rejects that opinion, which teaches that the will is determined by divine motion to one part.

CLIII. To the objection I respond, that a mover from necessity causes motion, when it so subjects the mobile to itself, that it does not leave in it the power to the opposite, but otherwise if it leaves in the mobile the possibility to the opposite, and fosters and preserves it: but predetermining motion, according to the Thomists, so moves the will to one, that it leaves the possibility to the opposite; and so although it infinitely exceeds the capacity of the will, and subjects it to itself efficaciously as to application and use, nevertheless it does not move it from necessity, but by way of freedom, as St. Thomas teaches in the places cited above, especially in Part 1, Question 83, article 1, in reply to the 3rd objection.

I add that, although divine motion on the part of the cause infinitely exceeds the capacity of the will, because it is an efflux from the first cause, and a certain participation of divine omnipotence, nevertheless on the part of the act and object to which it is terminated, it does not equal the whole capacity of the will, because it does not move and apply it to universal good, which is its adequate object, but only to certain particular goods, which are its inadequate and partial objects: hence although entitatively it is not subject to free choice, nevertheless terminatively it is subject to it: for the act, and the object to which it is terminated, are entirely subject to the will; because, as I said, the will, as it is under divine motion, retains the power of not eliciting, or suspending the act, to which it is moved, and of not choosing or rejecting the object which it pursues.

CLIV. To the first confirmation I respond, that St. Thomas very well says, that qualities, which are subject to the judgment of reason and the will, do not take away freedom: nevertheless it is not permitted to infer from this, that all qualities which precede the will, and are not subject to the judgment of reason, take away freedom: especially if they proceed from the first cause and root of freedom, and are given for this, that the will freely determine itself, and exercise its freedom, and reduce it from first act to second; as we declared with various examples in the treatise on predestination, explaining the

harmony of freedom with divine providence and predestination. Hence since predetermining motion is a certain efflux from the first free, and proceeds from the first root of all freedom and contingency (namely the infinite efficacy of the divine will); and precedes the free determination of our will, by way of cause or actual principle, by priority of nature; although it is not subject to the judgment of reason and the will, nevertheless it does not take away or injure its freedom, but fosters, preserves, and perfects it: indeed it is repugnant, that with it removed, there be given the use and actual exercise of freedom, as we demonstrated there. Hence

CLV. To the second confirmation let it be said, that St. Thomas only wills, that to be necessary, which is immutably determined to one by way of nature; that is without the objective indifference of judgment, and possibility to the opposite; in which way the will here on the way is determined to good in general, and in the Fatherland to the divine goodness clearly seen; but not if that is immutably determined to one by way of freedom, or with the objective indifference of judgment, and possibility to the opposite, just as the will is immutably determined to its free acts by divine motion. Therefore the same Holy Doctor in Question 6 on Evil, the sole article, in reply to the 3rd objection, says thus: "Brute animals are moved by the instinct of a superior agent to something determinate, according to the way of a particular form, the conception of which the sensitive appetite follows: but God moves the will indeed immutably, on account of the efficacy of the moving power, which cannot fail; but on account of the nature of the moved will, which relates itself indifferently to diverse things, necessity is not induced, but freedom remains." Hence when there in the body of the article he teaches that what the will cannot avoid is not free, this is to be understood of that, which the will cannot avoid, neither in the composite sense, nor in the divided sense; but he does not deny that to be free, which although the will cannot avoid it in the composite sense, and by consequent power, it can nevertheless avoid in the divided sense, and by antecedent power. For as he himself says in 1 to Annibaldum cited above: "Although the contrary of that which is willed by God, cannot stand with the divine will, nevertheless the possibility to the contrary can stand with it, on account of the contingency of the middle cause: and this suffices for this, that the effect is contingent, and not necessary." The adversary being unable to comprehend this doctrine and subtle distinction, ridicules and mocks it, ironically exclaiming: "But who may grasp this acute distinction? For what, I pray, else is it for the will with all pre-requisites to be able not to operate, than for it to be able to posit the absence of operation? Who would notice even the least distinction between these?" But, as Sylvius beautifully says in the opuscule on the first mover, those who ridicule this distinction, should rather bewail their ignorance: for as St. Thomas testifies in Question 6 on Truth, article 4, in reply to the 8th objection, this distinction is so celebrated and ancient, that all

the ancient Theologians use it to reconcile freedom with divine providence and predestination: "It is commonly said," he says, "that this: God can predestine the non-predestined, is false in the composite sense, but true in the divided sense; and therefore all those ways of speaking, which imply the composite sense, are simply false." Likewise Venerable Bede in philosophical axioms collected from Aristotle, letter O, has this: "All future things will come about from necessity 1 Periherm. This is true in the composite sense, but not in the divided sense: or it is true from hypothesis, but not simply." Just as therefore for freedom it is not required, that while someone is actually operating, he can not operate in the composite sense, or compose and conjoin the absence of operation with operation itself (for this implies a manifest contradiction) but it suffices that for the whole time in which he operates, he retain the absolute power of not acting. So similarly we say, that for freedom it is not required, that the will with the pre-requisites for acting, by priority only of causality and nature (such as are previous concurrence, and predetermining grace) can compose the negation of action: because since those things which are pre-required for acting only according to the order of nature, are simultaneous with the act (for priority of nature is only priority of causality and the instant from which, but not priority of time and the instant in which) if it could compose the negation of action with them, it could conjoin non-act with act, and form with its absence. It suffices therefore for freedom, that with those pre-requisites the power to not operating stand simultaneously, or that the will, as it stands under predetermining motion, retain the absolute power of dissenting or not operating; although with it the actual absence of operation cannot simultaneously be; as we have extensively shown, and declared with various examples in the treatise on predestination, explaining the harmony of freedom with divine providence and predestination.

CLVI. To the third confirmation, I respond that St. Thomas in the cited place only wills, that since God moves the will according to its condition and nature, He so moves it, that nevertheless it is not moved from necessity, but remains indifferent, not by potential and suspensive indifference (for it is repugnant that the will be efficaciously moved to acting, and nevertheless remain in mere potency, indetermination, and suspension) but by actual and positive indifference: because He so moves it, that under divine motion it always retains the power of dissenting, or tending to other objects and particular goods; and therefore he says, that "God moves it as behaving indeterminately toward many things": he did not say, toward all things, but toward many, because by divine motion it is determined to one, or to several, and behaves indeterminately toward others.

CLVII. The adversary objects again in sections 9 and 10 several testimonies of St. Thomas, in which he asserts, that we can resist divine grace, and reject it. For in

Quodlibet 1, article 7, in reply to the 2nd objection, he says: "Thus God moves the human mind to good, that nevertheless it can resist this motion": but if divine motion were to physically predetermine our will to the good work, the will could not resist it, for it is repugnant that such motion lack its effect, or that the will resist it: therefore according to St. Thomas, divine motion does not physically predetermine our will to good.

CLVIII. This is confirmed: The same Holy Doctor in Part 1, Question 62, article 3, in reply to the 2nd objection, says that "The inclination of grace does not impose necessity, but he who has grace can not use it and sin." And in Question 63, article 7, in reply to the 3rd objection: "However great," he says, "the inclination to good was in the supreme Angel, nevertheless it did not induce necessity to him: hence through free choice he could not follow it." Likewise in Part 1-2, Question 106, article 2, in reply to the 2nd objection, he asserts that "The grace of the New Testament, although it helps man not to sin, nevertheless does not confirm him in good so that man cannot sin; for this pertains to the state of glory: and therefore if anyone after receiving the grace of the New Testament will have sinned, he is worthy of greater punishment, as being ungrateful for greater benefits, and not using the aid given to him." These things seem to cohere minimally with the opinion of physical predetermination: both because physically predetermining grace seems to impose necessity to good, and consequently render the will impeccable: and also, because the will cannot use it, since it is not subject to free choice, as to efficacy and use, but rather subjects it to itself and applies it to operating: therefore this opinion seems entirely alien to the mind and doctrine of St. Thomas.

CLIX. This is further confirmed: The same Angelic Doctor in Part 1-2, Question 68, article 1, treating of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, teaches that man through them is rightly disposed, that he may be made promptly mobile by divine inspiration, or that he may well follow the instinct of the Holy Spirit: but if when man is efficaciously moved, to some act, that motion is so powerful, that of itself it overcomes all resistance of the passive however intense, why is it necessary that certain gifts and supernatural aids, by which he may be disposed to follow more easily divine inspiration, be infused into him? As if created agents need some preparation for doing those things, which they cannot not do, even if no such preparation is present? Indeed he would be worthy of laughter, who supposing that man, with the vision of God alone posited, cannot not love God, would nevertheless require a certain previous preparation, by which man seeing God, might more easily let himself be moved to such love. And no less worthy of laughter would be the Holy Doctor, if believing that man, with efficacious grace alone posited in his will, cannot not consent to its pre-motion, he would still require the great apparatus of the gifts

of the Holy Spirit, as a previous disposition necessary for producing consent with greater facility. So Peter of St. Joseph in disputation 1, section 9.

CLX. But these things are of no weight, and can easily be removed. To the argument therefore I respond, that man can resist or dissent from any divine motion; with this difference, however, that to motion purely exciting, and affording only sufficient aid, man can resist both in the composite sense, and the divided, and not only by antecedent power, but also by consequent; indeed in fact the will often resists this motion, and rejects and repudiates it, or deprives it of the effect to which it is ultimately ordained: but to physically preventing motion, and affording efficacious aid, the will never in fact resists, nor can it resist it in the composite sense, and by consequent power, but only by antecedent power, and in the divided sense. Therefore St. Thomas in this Question 10, article 4, in reply to the 3rd objection: "If God," he says, "moves the will to something, it is impossible to posit that the will is not moved to that, nevertheless it is not impossible simply." And in Question 112, article 3, in the body: "If it is from the intention of God moving, that the man, whose heart He moves, should attain grace, he attains it infallibly." Likewise in Quodlibet 12, article 3, he teaches that "Predestination has certainty on the part of the knowledge of God, which cannot be deceived, and on the part of the divine will, which nothing can resist." Hence this argument can be made in favor of our opinion. Not only St. Thomas, but also Scripture, Councils, and the Holy Fathers, sometimes assert that we can resist the divine will, or the Holy Spirit, and His motion; and sometimes in fact it is resisted; as is clear from Acts 6: "You have always resisted the Holy Spirit"; and in the Council of Sens it is said, "That the aid of God is not such, that it cannot be resisted." Likewise Innocent X in the new constitution proscribed this proposition as heretical: "Interior grace in the state of fallen nature is never resisted." On the other hand the same Scripture often asserts that no one resists the will of God, as in Genesis 50, Esther 13, Romans 9, and St. Augustine frequently teaches that grace is rejected by no hard heart, and that it most victoriously, insuperably, and inevitably moves the will: likewise St. Thomas says, that if God moves the will to something, it is impossible to posit that the will is not moved to that. Therefore in order that these testimonies be reconciled with each other, a twofold motion must be admitted, one only morally exciting, or affording only sufficient aid, which the will can resist, and in fact resists; the other physically preventing, and affording efficacious aid, which is never resisted: or it is necessary to recur to the distinction of the composite sense and the divided, or antecedent and consequent power; and it must be said that the will can resist divine motion, by antecedent power, and in the divided sense, but not by consequent power, and in the composite sense.

I add that, if the argument taken from the possibility of resisting grace, were efficacious, it would militate not only against predetermining grace, but also against congruous grace: for Suarez in book 5 on aids, chapter 39, teaches that congruous grace, as such, is never resisted; because under this formality it is efficacious, and infallibly infers consent.

CLXI. To the first confirmation I respond that St. Thomas in the cited places expressly speaks of sanctifying grace, which since it has the account of habit and permanent form, is subject to free choice, as to use; for we use habits when we will: therefore that in the state of the way does not so confirm man in good, that he cannot sin; but this pertains to the state of the Fatherland, in which it will be consummated through the clear vision of God, and beatific love. But actual grace, since it is given by way of motion and impulse, nor has the account of habit, but of transient aid, is not subject to free choice as to efficacy and use, but rather subjects it to itself powerfully and sweetly, by moving and applying it conformably to its nature and condition, namely under the objective indifference of judgment, and leaving the power to the opposite: hence although it efficaciously and infallibly determines the will to good, nevertheless it does not inflict violence on it, "Nor does it abolish, but builds up free choice," as Prosper says in sentence 51 in response to the chapter of the Gauls: "For He reaches from end to end mightily, and arranges all things sweetly," as it is said in Wisdom 8. And therefore St. Thomas rightly said here in Question 10, article 4, that God so moves our will "That He does not of necessity determine it to one thing." By which words it is so far from the case that he proscribes our opinion, as adversaries think, that rather he openly favors it: for just as he who would say "Peter does not run quickly," would not deny that he runs, but only that he runs in such a way, that is quickly and with speed; so similarly the Holy Doctor asserting that God does not determine the will of necessity to one thing, does not deny the predetermination of the will to one thing, but rather establishes and confirms it, and only excludes absolute necessity contrary to freedom from it, and denies that it is induced by it. Hence, as we saw above in Section 2, he says that Damascene asserting that God foreknows, but does not predetermine those things which are done by us, "is to be explained so that it is understood; that those things which are in us, are not subject to the divine determination, as if receiving necessity from it."

CLXII. To the second confirmation it must be said, that although predetermining motion is most efficacious, and so powerful that it overcomes all resistance of the will without any difficulty at all, nevertheless St. Thomas rightly teaches, that the gifts of the Holy Spirit are to be posited in man, by which he may be disposed to follow promptly and easily divine motion, as the same Holy Doctor reasons in Part 2-2, Question 23, article 2, with these words: "It is necessary that the will be so moved by the Holy Spirit, that it also

be efficient of its act. But no act is perfectly produced by any active power, unless it is connatural to it through some form, which is the principle of action: hence God, who moves all things to due ends, induces in each thing forms, through which they are inclined to the ends appointed to them by God; and according to this He arranges all things sweetly, as it is said in Wisdom 8. Unless therefore some form were superadded to the natural power, through which it might be inclined to the act of love, this act would be more imperfect than natural acts, and the acts of other virtues, nor would it be easy and delightful... Hence it is necessary that for the act of charity there exist in us some habitual form superadded to the natural power, and inclining it to the act of charity, and making it operate promptly and delightfully." What St. Thomas said about the habit of charity, is to be said with proportion about the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which are certain infused habits, by which man is perfected to obey promptly the Holy Spirit, as the same Holy Doctor says below in Question 68, article 3. For although the Holy Spirit can without any difficulty at all and resistance move the mind of man to whatever He will (for "He has," says Augustine, "most omnipotent power of inclining hearts, and has the wills of men more in His power, than men themselves") nevertheless because the mind of man is not only moved by the Holy Spirit, but also moves itself, by eliciting supernatural acts, in order that it may be moved sweetly and connaturally, it must be perfected with the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Hence St. Thomas in the place just cited objects to himself this argument: "The gifts of the Holy Spirit perfect man, according as he is moved by the Spirit of God: but insofar as man is moved by the Spirit of God, he behaves in some way as an instrument with respect to Him; but it is not fitting that an instrument be perfected through a habit, but the principal agent: therefore the gifts of the Holy Spirit are not habits." To which argument he responds thus: "To the second it must be said, that that argument proceeds from an instrument whose role is not to act, but only to be acted upon: but man is not such an instrument, but is so acted upon by the Holy Spirit, that he also acts, insofar as he is of free choice, hence he needs a habit."

And this response and doctrine can be confirmed from the fact that in Christ, and in the Blessed there are the gifts of the Holy Spirit, as St. Thomas teaches of Christ, in Part 3, Question 7, article 5, and of the Blessed in Part 1-2, Question 68, article 6, and nevertheless it is certain that Christ, and the Blessed, neither resist, nor can resist the Holy Spirit, or not consent to His motion, otherwise they could sin: therefore from the fact that our will cannot resist in the composite sense, or by consequent power, predetermining grace, the adversary does not rightly infer, that the great apparatus of the gifts of the Holy Spirit is uselessly posited in the soul, which can also be declared by the example which he himself uses. For it is certain that from the clear vision of God there necessarily flows beatific love, and the Blessed, both as to specification, and as to

exercise, are necessitated to loving God: and nevertheless with this not being an obstacle the habit of charity is posited in their will, that it may make it operate connaturally and delightfully: therefore a fortiori in us wayfarers infused habits, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit are to be posited, that we may operate promptly, delightfully, and connaturally, although His motion is so powerful and efficacious, that it overcomes all resistance of our will, and infallibly infers the effect which He intends.

Other arguments of the adversary are futile, and do not need a solution: for they suppose and do not prove, that predetermining grace necessitates the will, and with it once posited in the will, the will cannot not act, or dissent from it, or posit the opposite act, or not use it: all of which things, as is clear from what has been said, are entirely alien to the mind, and doctrine of the Thomists, indeed are condemned by them as heretical. Hence this author has labored uselessly, and has squandered oil and effort, while from those false principles, or from the perverse and erroneous understanding of the composite and divided sense, which he has feigned for himself, or drawn from the fountains of the Moderns, he has multiplied so many arguments. I also pass over what he objects against predetermination to the material of sin, or to the entity which is subjected to moral malice: because in the treatise on the will of God this difficulty has been exactly discussed. But the arguments which proceed from the injury of freedom, have been most fully and most clearly solved in the treatise on predestination, in treating of the harmony of freedom with divine providence, and predestination. Therefore here it only remains to solve what the adversary objects in section 12, namely that the older and more excellent disciples of St. Thomas, such as Capreolus, Ferrariensis, Cajetan, Soto, exclude physical predetermination; and to demonstrate briefly that those four Doctors, who deservedly can be called the princes of the Thomists, most openly favor our opinion. Hence let it be

§ XVI.
It is shown that the older Thomists taught physical predetermination.

CLXIII. It can scarcely be called into doubt, whether Capreolus and Ferrariensis, the most ancient disciples of St. Thomas, admitted physical predetermination. For Suarez admits this in the first place about Ferrariensis in book 5 on aids, chapter 29, number 4, and it is manifest from the following words which he has there: "Concerning this proposition, the superior agent gives to the inferior agent the power through which it acts, or preserves it, or applies it to acting, it must be noted from the doctrine of St. Thomas on power, question 3, article 7, that a twofold power for acting inheres in created things while they act, one is a form having firm and established being in nature, through which they act as if by their own proper and natural power; the other is a power, which is only

an intention of the divine power, having incomplete being in the way that colors are in the air and the power of art in the instrument: and this power is not fitting to things, except when they actually operate and act, as instruments of the divine power; just as the power of art does not remain in the instrument, except when the craftsman uses it to the operation of art. God therefore gives both powers to natural things: but He communicates only the second to them when He applies them to operation: therefore St. Thomas said, that the superior agent gives to the inferior agent the power through which it acts, and preserves it, which pertains to the first power, or applies it to acting, which is effected through the second."Nothing clearer and more explicit can be said in favor of our opinion: for by the name of physical predetermination we understand nothing else, than a certain flowing and transient power, behaving by way of motion and impulse, which God gives to secondary causes prior in nature than they operate, and by the means of which He applies them to eliciting determinate acts, and consequently physically pre-moves and predetermines them.

CLXIV. Capreolus also recognized this power applying secondary causes to acting in 2 Sentences, distinction 1, question 2, where he hands down the same doctrine, and transcribes almost word for word the article 7 cited above from St. Thomas in Question 3 on power. Similarly in distinction 28, in reply to the 12th objection, he says: "The will does not cause, except applied, and quasi instrumentally moved by God." Hence the Coimbricans in the place related above in Section 5, openly admit, that St. Thomas, Capreolus, and Ferrariensis, stand for our opinion, for they say: "Concerning the way in which God concurs with secondary causes for their operations and effects, there presents itself the celebrated opinion of ST. THOMAS, CAPREOLUS, FERRARIENSIS, etc." Likewise Conrad, an ancient Thomist, in Part 1-2, on Question 109, article 9, posits divine motion conserving and applying to operating: and on Question 112, article 3, verse "Note secondly," he explains the same doctrine. Hence there can only be doubt about the mind of Cajetan, and Dominic Soto, the most famous Thomists. For Cajetan in Part 1, Question 19, article 8, says: "When the secondary cause is said to be moved by the first, this is to be understood, not of previous motion, but of motion intrinsically cooperating with proper action." And he adds "It would be a puerile sense, if someone should think there is some duration of nature, in whose first instant the first cause looks to the effect, and in the second the second." But Soto in book 1 on nature and grace, chapter 15, seems to teach that the assent of free choice is the cause why grace is efficacious in one, but not in another; and consequently that it does not predetermine free choice, but rather expects its consent and determination.

CLXV. Nevertheless these authors also teach our opinion clearly enough. For Cajetan in Part 1, Question 45, article 5, section "To Durandus," relates and approves the doctrine of St. Thomas in Question 3 on power, article 7, where it is said that no cause can act unless moved and applied by God: in which place the Holy Doctor, as even Suarez himself admitted in book 1 on the concurrence of God, chapter 11, taught physical pre-motion. Likewise in Part 1, Question 15, article 9, section "For the evidence," he says that "inferior agents never coact with heaven unless they simultaneously suffer from heaven." And he immediately gives the reason: "For," he says, "they do not move, unless moved." And for the same reason, he immediately adds: "Prior naturally is it, that inferior bodies suffer and are moved by superior ones, than coact with them." Since therefore he everywhere teaches, that no secondary cause can act, unless moved by God; and moreover in Part 1-2, Question 80, article 1, he says "That although God without me could cause that act which is mine, nevertheless He cannot be the cause why I elicit that act, unless He moves me to elicit it": it is manifest, that according to the principles of this author, secondary causes, prior in nature than they cooperate with God, suffer from Him, or receive some previous influx from Him, which is for them to be physically pre-moved. Finally, that most learned Cardinal in the place related above in Section 9, and in Part 2-2, Question 172, article 2, section "To the 2nd," lucidly declares, that the motion of divine grace is efficacious from within, and infallibly moves the heart of man, whither He wills, and when He wills, according to that of Proverbs 21: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord: whithersoever He will He shall turn it." But grace efficacious from within, physically predetermines free choice, and does not expect its determination, as we showed above: therefore according to the doctrine of Cajetan physical predetermination is to be admitted, not only in the order of nature, but also in the order of grace.

CLXVI. Nor is the place adduced to the contrary an obstacle: for there he does not intend to deny the previous influx of the first cause into the second, as to this that the first applies, and conjoins the power of the secondary cause to the effect; but he denies only that influx, by which God would give the whole power to the secondary cause, so that it would operate precisely as moved, and as an instrument properly so called, as a stick operates as moved by the hand: for this would be to take away from secondary causes proper operative powers, by which they cooperate with the first cause, and by reason of which the first cause cooperates with them. But that Cajetan is to be understood thus, is clear from his own words; for he adds there in section "And if certain": "For the secondary cause does not move, on account of this precisely because it is moved, but also from its own power." By which words, and others which he adds there, and which I omit for the sake of brevity, he openly declares that he does not deny all previous motion of the first cause, but only that, which would give the whole power of acting, and exclude

the cooperation of the secondary cause, or which would be prior to the operation of the secondary cause, not only by priority of causality and the instant from which, but also by priority of duration and the instant in which. But what do these have to do with the physical pre-motion which the Thomists teach? Who of them has said or dreamed, that it is the whole reason of acting, and excludes the concurrence or cooperation of the secondary cause, or precedes its action and effect, not only by priority of causality and the instant from which, but also by priority of duration and the instant in which?

CLXVII. But what Cajetan adds, that there is no duration of nature, in which the first cause looks to the effect of the secondary cause first, and afterwards the second, is most true, because the effect to be produced is simultaneously looked to and attained by the first and second cause: but with this it stands, that the secondary cause itself must be first moved and applied to operating: for if the first cause should first in nature produce the effects of the secondary cause, especially by priority of the instant in which, the secondary cause would produce nothing, but its influx would find the effect produced. But that this is the true mind of Cajetan, is clear from the fact that in that article he impugns the doctrine of Scotus, who in book 1 of the sentences, distinction 8, had said that "No secondary cause causes, except with the first cause co-causing its effect, and this more naturally prior, than the proximate cause itself causes." Which, as absurd, and making a puerile sense, Cajetan rightly rejects; but he does not deny, nor could deny, unless openly contradicting the doctrine of St. Thomas, that the concurrence of God is prior by priority of nature, and of the instant from which, to the operation of the secondary cause: for St. Thomas expressly teaches this in the places related above by us. To which can be added what the same Holy Doctor says in Part 1, Question 82, article 3, in reply to the 2nd objection, proving that the intellect is prior to the will, like active to passive, because the intellect through the good known moves the will: from which it is clear, according to St. Thomas, that which moves another, must be prior to that which is moved, like active to passive: but the divine concurrence moves the will, and all secondary causes: therefore it must be prior to every action of creatures, at least by priority of causality and nature. The words of the Holy Doctor are: "That which is first simply, and according to the order of nature, is more perfect: for thus act is prior to potency. And in this way the intellect is prior to the will, as the motive to the mobile, and active to passive: for the good understood moves the will." Which he also clearly expressed in Part 1-2, Question 145, article 8, where he has this: "In any natural motion the first is the motion itself of the mover, the second is the disposition of the matter, or the motion itself of the mobile, the last is the end or terminus of the motion to which the motion of the mover is terminated." Which he had said in almost the same words in article 6 of the same question. And the reason is evident: for every cause is prior in nature

to its effect: but the motion of the mover is the cause of the motion of the mobile: therefore the motion of the mobile is preceded by priority of nature by the motion of the mover. Nor can these be understood of priority of perfection and dignity: because St. Thomas expressly speaks of priority of causality and nature: for he says: "That which is first simply and according to the order of nature, etc." And in Part 1-2, article 8 cited he proves the motion of free choice in sin, and this similarly in the attainment of grace: which can be understood only of priority of nature and causality, as is clear. Hence in Against the Gentiles 1, chapter 13, he says thus: "In movers and mobiles ordered, of which one through order is moved by another, the first is THE CAUSE OF MOVING for all others." And in book 3, chapter 149: "The motion of the mover precedes the movement of the mobile BY REASON AND CAUSE." Therefore St. Thomas admits motion previous by priority of causality and nature, and not purely simultaneous and concomitant. Hence if Cajetan were to deny it, he would openly contradict the Holy Doctor, which is not to be thought about him, but rather it is to be said, that he excludes only previous motion, which is the whole reason of acting, and takes away the cooperation of the secondary cause, or which is prior not only by priority of nature and the instant from which, but also by priority of duration and the instant in which.

CLXVIII. As for Dominic Soto, whom adversaries call the Thomist of the first magnitude, it is still more evident, that he stands for our opinion, and teaches physical pre-motion. For in the cited book on nature and grace, chapter 16, he says thus: "While I am moved freely, I can in the divided sense not act, and then the concurrence of God will cease, although in the composite sense these fight against each other, that God act toward me by that action, and I not act." Which can be understood of no motion, except physical and through itself efficacious: for it does not repudiate that motion, which depends as to its efficacy on the consent of free choice, and which as far as is of itself, is only indifferent, is in free choice, and that freedom does not use it. Nor should you say with Peter of St. Joseph, that this is to be explained of simultaneous motion, which it is repugnant to be, unless the will also concurs simultaneously: for Soto expressly indicates that he is speaking of previous concurrence, when he adds there: "There is no doubt but that the concurrence of God accompanies, as they say, the action, and is nevertheless required for any secondary cause to act, indeed even PREREQUISITE BY NATURE." And again, speaking of our free acts, he says: "Not prior in time by God than by us, but simultaneously by God and by us they are done, but by Him PRIOR IN NATURE." Finally in chapter 18, treating of the concurrence of God to evil acts and sinful ones, he writes this: "Theologians by no means deny, that God is the cause of the entity (so they call it) which is sin, by that genus of efficiency by which He moves all animate and inanimate things to their natural actions." Which words cannot be understood except of

physical pre-motion, since natural agents and those devoid of reason are not capable of moral motion. No one therefore (unless he wishes to diffuse darkness over the sun, and as they say, to be blind at noon) can call into doubt, that Dominic Soto taught previous concurrence, or physical pre-motion, in those books on nature and grace themselves, which he published in the Council of Trent, and dedicated to the Fathers collected in the sixth and seventh Synod. Which books were approved with praise by the Legates of the Council; indeed Soto himself, on account of his remarkable ardor in propagating the faith, and putting the Heretics to flight, deserved to be given by the Fathers of Trent an illustrious emblem, namely of a flame breaking forth from the conjunction of two hands, with this epigraph: "FAITH WHICH WORKS THROUGH LOVE."

CLXIX. Nor should it move anyone, that the same author in the same book 1 on nature and grace, chapter 15, seems to teach, that the consent of free choice is the cause why grace is efficacious in one, but not in another. For he himself at the end of his commentaries on book 4 of the sentences, explains this of a material and dispositive cause only, and says: "Although the prior efficient cause which converts us, is the preventing motion of God, nevertheless the material disposition (which in this way is called cause) is our assent. Just as the efficient cause bringing it about that a window is opened, is the air entering, and the material cause why the air enters, is because the window is opened."

LAUS DEO